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TRUTH IN LENDING? THE SURVIVAL OF A BORROWER’S 
STATUTORY CLAIM FOR RESCISSION 




In the years preceding the financial crisis of 2008, the prevalence 
of mortgage lenders issuing mortgages to individuals who, for many 
possible reasons, could not repay the loans created a housing bubble 
that eventually burst.1  One of these loans was given to Kathryn 
McOmie-Gray, who closed a first deed trust loan in 2006 and was 
provided with various disclosure documents to sign, pursuant to the 
Truth In Lending Act (TILA).2  While these documents informed Ms. 
McOmie-Gray of her right to rescind the transaction, the lender 
failed to inform her of the date on which the right to rescind would 
expire.3  This failure to disclose the expiration date violated TILA and 
entitled Ms. McOmie-Gray to rescission.4 
Two years later, Ms. McOmie-Gray sought to exercise her 
rescission right by notifying the lender of her intention to rescind.5  
The bank, however, refused to honor the rescission and instead 
 
* J.D., 2013, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2010, Rutgers University, New 
Brunswick, New Jersey.  I must thank Professor Linda E. Fisher for her invaluable 
advice regarding the Truth in Lending Act as well her insight into the practical, real-
world implications of the legal issues discussed in this Comment.  I also thank 
Professor Jordan Paradise for her expert advice with respect to the portions of this 
Comment discussing administrative law. 
 1  Jeff Sovern, Help for the Perplexed Home Buyer, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2012, at A29, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/19/opinion/a-guide-for-the-new-
mortgage-form.html?_r=0 (“During the housing bubble, countless borrowers took 
on mortgages they could not repay.”). 
 2  McOmie-Gray v. Bank of Am. Home Loans, 667 F.3d 1325, 1326 (9th Cir. 
2012).  The facts of McOmie-Gray as reproduced in this section are taken from the 
opinion of the court, which accepted the plaintiff’s allegations as true for purposes of 
ruling on a motion to dismiss. 
 3  Id. 
 4  15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(b) (2011).  
 5  McOmie-Gray, 667 F.3d at 1326.   
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began a year-long negotiation regarding the loan terms.6  After 
negotiations failed, Ms. McOmie-Gray finally filed a claim to enforce 
the rescission, but the claim was dismissed by the court as untimely.7  
The court held that because the claim was filed over three years after 
the loan was created, it was barred under TILA.8  The court 
precluded relief even though Ms. McOmie-Gray exercised the right 
to rescind by notifying the lender a year earlier, in accordance with 
the statutory and regulatory requirements.9  In essence, the bank 
avoided rescission liability for its own TILA violation by delaying and 
negotiating with Ms. McOmie-Gray until the statutory time limit 
expired.10 
TILA11 requires lenders to make a number of disclosures to 
consumers before finalizing loans, in order to promote the informed 
use of credit and to protect consumers against deceptive lender 
practices.12  Though TILA was originally passed in 1968, the surge in 
foreclosure filings following the bursting of the mortgage bubble in 
2008 has brought TILA’s disclosure regime to the forefront of 
policymaking.13  Indeed, the issuance of loans to borrowers who 
simply did not understand the terms of their loans was a significant 
factor contributing to the mortgage crisis.14  Thus, disclosure 
requirements are seen as an essential tool to protect consumers from 
abusive practices by the lending industry and to avoid another 
 
 6  Id. 
 7  Id. 
 8  Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) (2006).  
 9  McOmie-Gray, 667 F.3d at 1326; 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a); 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f); 12 
C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(2).  
 10  McOmie-Gray, 667 F.3d at 1326.  
 11  15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667f (2012).  
 12  15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2012) (“It is the purpose of this title to assure a 
meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare 
more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use 
of credit, and to protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit billing 
and credit card practices.”); see also Chase Bank USA, NA v. McCoy, 131 S. Ct. 871, 
874–75 (2011) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a)) (“Congress passed TILA to promote 
consumers’ ‘informed use of credit’ by requiring ‘meaningful disclosure of credit 
terms.’”). 
 13  See Jeff Sovern, Preventing Future Economic Crises Through Consumer Protection Law 
or How the Truth in Lending Act Failed the Subprime Borrowers, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 761 
(2010); Les Christie, Foreclosures up a record 81% in 2008, CNN MONEY (Jan. 15, 2009, 
3:48 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2009/01/15/real_estate/ 
millions_in_foreclosure/index.htm. 
 14  See, e.g., Richard Gandon, UNDERSTANDING THE MORTGAGE MELTDOWN WHAT 
HAPPENED AND WHO’S TO BLAME, http://www.moneymatters101.com/mortgage
/meltdown.asp. 
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mortgage bubble.15  The recent passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (hereinafter “Dodd-
Frank”), a broad piece of legislation focused in large part on 
protecting consumers from abusive financial services practices, 
underscores the importance of TILA disclosures in protecting 
consumers.16  Under Dodd-Frank, TILA rulemaking authority was 
transferred from the Federal Reserve to the newly created Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau.17 
In addition to mandating disclosure requirements, TILA also 
provides an important substantive right for consumers: the right to 
rescind certain mortgage transactions—mostly refinancing 
arrangements and financing for remodeling efforts on principal 
dwellings—when adequate disclosures are not provided.18  As 
foreclosure filings increased during the financial crisis of 2008, the 
number of rescission cases also increased.19  Rescission has become an 
effective tool for borrowers seeking to protect their homes against 
lenders who, in the lead-up to the financial crisis, engaged in abusive 
or deceptive credit practices by failing to provide required disclosure 
forms.20  Often, for borrowers who have taken on loans they cannot 
repay due to inadequate lender disclosures, rescission is not only the 
most powerful remedy, but the sole remedy.21 
 
 15  CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, LEARN ABOUT THE BUREAU, 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/the-bureau/ (“An informed consumer is the first 
line of defense against abusive practices.”).  
 16  Preamble, Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (“An Act To promote the financial 
stability of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in the 
financial system, to end “too big to fail”, to protect the American taxpayer by ending 
bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other 
purposes.”) (emphasis added). 
 17  Dodd-Frank § 1100A; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1604(a) (2012) (current statute 
granting TILA rulemaking authority to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau); 
1 THOMPSON & RENUART, TRUTH IN LENDING, § 1.2.11, at 11 (7th ed. 2010). 
 18  15 U.S.C. § 1635 (2012); see citations and accompanying text, supra notes 47, 
48. 
 19  Carter Dougherty, Banks Push Fed to Curb Borrowers’ Right to Rescind Mortgages, 
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 16, 2010 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-12-
16/fed-mortgage-recission-plan-sparks-fight-between-lenders-consumer-groups.html 
(citing an estimate from Kathleen Day, spokeswoman for the Center for Responsible 
Lending, estimating “thousands” of rescission cases pending due to the economic 
crisis).   
 20  Editorial, The Fed and Foreclosures, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2010, at A24, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/29/opinion/29mon2.html.  
 21  Id. (describing rescission as “the most effective legal tool that borrowers have 
to fight foreclosures”). 
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TILA provides a general three-day period for a borrower to 
rescind the transaction, which is exercised by notifying the lender.  
When rescission is exercised within this three-day period, it is known 
as “buyer’s remorse” rescission.22  If required disclosures are never 
provided, under 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) (hereinafter “§ 1635(f)”), the 
right of rescission extends to three years after the close of the 
transaction or sale of the property.23  While it is clear that a borrower 
must simply notify the lender to exercise the three-day buyer’s 
remorse rescission, the method of exercising rescission during the 
extended three-year rescission period under § 1635(f) is less clear 
because that specific subsection of the statute is silent on the issue.24  
The Supreme Court has not provided any guidance on this issue.  In 
Beach v. Ocwen Federal Bank,  the Court described § 1635(f) as a strict 
bar on claims filed outside the three-year period, but the Court did 
not address the actual method of properly exercising rescission within 
the three-year period.25 
While the statute,26 accompanying regulation,27 and even the 
model disclosure forms28 all suggest that a borrower exercises 
rescission by notifying the lender, a dispute has developed among the 
circuits concerning how the consumer may satisfy the extended 
three-year limit for exercising rescission.  Many courts have correctly 
concluded that notifying the lender of rescission in accordance with 
the statute and regulations suffices.29  As the statutory and regulatory 
language indicates, these courts have held that § 1635(f) does not 
contain a filing requirement and only limits a borrower’s right to 
assert rescission.  The majority of courts, however, often relying upon 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Beach, have required that a borrower 
 
 22  15 U.S.C. § 1635(a); Jacob Werrett, Achieving Meaningful Mortgage Reform, 42 
CONN. L. REV. 319, 337 (2009). 
 23  15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) (2012).  
 24  15 U.S.C. § 1635(f).  The accompanying regulation states that a borrower 
exercises rescission the same way under § 1635(f) as under § 1635(a), but this has 
not been enough to allay the confusion among the circuits.  See, e.g., McOmie-Gray v. 
Bank of Am. Home Loans, 667 F.3d 1325 (9th Cir. 2012); see also discussion infra Part 
IV.C (arguing in favor of deference to the regulation). 
 25  Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410 (1998); see discussion infra Part III.B.  
 26  15 U.S.C. § 1635(a), (f). 
 27  12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(2) (2011). 
 28  12 C.F.R. § 226, app. H-8 (2011).   
 29  See, e.g., Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., No. 11-4254, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 
2486 (3d Cir. Feb. 5, 2013); Gilbert v. Residential Funding LLC, 678 F.3d 271 (4th 
Cir. 2012); Barnes v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, No. 11-cv-142, 2011 WL 4950111 10 (D. 
Or. Oct. 18, 2011); Johnson v. Long Beach Mortg. Loan Trust, 451 F. Supp. 2d 16 
(D.D.C. 2006); In re Hunter, 400 B.R. 651 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2009). 
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also file a lawsuit within three years to avoid extinguishment of the 
rescission right.30  Ms. McOmie-Gray’s story typifies the situation of 
many borrowers after appellate courts adopted this approach.  
Instead of retaining rescission as a powerful remedial tool for 
borrowers to use without judicial intervention,31 these courts have 
unfortunately shifted the power of rescission into the hands of banks 
that can stonewall until the statutory time period expires, even after 
the borrower makes their intent to rescind clear—the situation that 
befell Ms. McOmie Gray. 
This Comment addresses the unresolved circuit split over what a 
borrower must do to satisfy the three-year time limitation for 
rescission under TILA, and argues that § 1635(f) and its 
accompanying regulation must be read plainly, to only require that 
borrowers notify the lender to exercise rescission. Part II provides an 
overview of TILA and the history of its passage, and details the 
statutory mechanism for rescission under TILA and the 
accompanying regulations.  Part III describes the recent circuit split 
regarding TILA’s rescission requirements and provides summaries of 
the reasoning applied in the most recent Courts of Appeals decisions.  
Part IV argues for an interpretation of §1635(f) that will protect 
borrowers without overburdening lenders.  Finally, Part V proposes 
legislative and judicial solutions to solve this problem uniformly 
throughout the circuits.  Courts that have read a filing requirement 
into the statute have misread the statute, misinterpreted Supreme 
Court precedent, and misunderstood important policy implications. 
II. OVERVIEW OF RESCISSION UNDER THE TRUTH IN LENDING ACT 
A. Background of the Truth In Lending Act 
In 1968, President Johnson signed the Consumer Credit 
Protection Act, which included the Truth In Lending Act.32  TILA was 
 
 30  See, e.g., Keiran v. Home Capital, 720 F.3d 721 (8th Cir. 2013); Rosenfield v. 
HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172 (10th Cir. 2012); McOmie-Gray v. Bank of Am. 
Home Loans, 667 F.3d 1325 (9th Cir. 2012); Geraghty v. BAC Home Loans Serv. LP, 
No. 11-336, 2011 WL 3920248 (D. Minn. Sept. 7, 2011); Bradford v. HSBC Mortg. 
Corp., 799 F. Supp. 2d 625 (E.D. Va.  2011); DeCosta v. U.S. Bancorp, No. 10-0301, 
2010 WL 3824224 (D. Md. Sept. 27, 2010). 
 31  Belini v. Wash. Mut. Bank, FA, 412 F.3d 17, 25 (1st Cir. 2005) (“[S]ection 1635 
is written with the goal of making the rescission process a private one, worked out 
between creditor and debtor without the intervention of the courts.”). 
 32  Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146, 146 (1968) (codified as 
amended in 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667f (2012)); THOMPSON & RENUART, supra note 17, 
§ 1.2.1, at 4. 
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passed as one of the later legislative achievements of President 
Johnson’s Great Society agenda, and its passage is now considered to 
be the “birth of modern consumer legislative activism.”33  By its own 
terms, the goal of TILA is to ensure meaningful disclosures of credit 
terms in consumer credit transactions.34  The drafters of TILA 
reasoned that meaningful disclosure would help consumers avoid the 
uninformed use of credit, and would protect them from inaccurate 
and unfair practices related to credit.35  In originally passing TILA, 
Congress believed that a meaningful disclosure of credit terms would 
also promote economic stability and competition.36 
In addition to the stated goal of TILA, the legislation has always 
been understood as remedial.37  Courts agree that TILA is a remedial 
statute because of its clear purpose to protect consumers against the 
uninformed use of credit offered by potentially deceptive creditors.38  
Given TILA’s remedial nature, courts have also agreed that the 
statute should be interpreted liberally to protect consumers.39  TILA’s 
grant of the powerful right of rescission to borrowers for certain loans 
that violate TILA’s requirements is emblematic of Congress’s pro-
consumer intent, which has also been recognized by the courts.40 
 
 33  THOMPSON & RENUART, supra note 17, at 5.  
 34  15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2012).  
 35  Id.  The language pertaining to protecting consumers from unfair and 
inaccurate credit practices was added by Congress in a 1974 amendment.  P.L. 93-495 
(Oct. 28, 1974), Title III, § 302; 88 Stat. 1511. 
 36  15 U.S.C. § 1601(a). 
 37  THOMPSON & RENUART, supra note 17, at 5 (describing the passage of TILA as 
the “birth of modern consumer legislative activism”). 
 38  See Littlefield v. Walt Flanagan & Co., 498 F.2d 1133, 1136 (10th Cir. 
1974) (quoting N. C. Freed Co. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 473 F.2d 
1210, 1214 (2d Cir. 1973)) (“The Act . . .  designed to prevent ‘unscrupulous and 
predatory creditor practices’ . . . is remedial.”); Begala v. PNC Bank, N.A., 163 F.3d 
948, 950 (6th Cir. Ohio 1998) (“We have repeatedly stated that TILA is a remedial 
statute.”); Smith v. No. 2 Galesburg Crown Finance Corp., 615 F.2d 407, 415 (7th Cir. 
1980) (finding that TILA action survives as remedial claim, and recognizing that 
“courts have tended to emphasize the remedial character of the statute”). 
 39  See Bragg v. Bill Heard Chevrolet, Inc., 374 F.3d 1060, 1065 (11th Cir. 
2004) (“As a remedial statute, TILA must be construed liberally in favor of the 
consumer.”); Begala, 163 F.3d at 950 (“We have repeatedly stated that TILA is a 
remedial statute and, therefore, should be given a broad, liberal construction in 
favor of the consumer.”); King v. California, 784 F.2d 910, 915 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(“The courts have construed TILA as a remedial statute, interpreting it liberally for 
the consumer.”) (citation omitted); James v. Home Constr. Co., 621 F.2d 727, 729 
(5th Cir. 1980) (“[T]he Truth-in-Lending Act, a remedial act, has usually been given 
a broad liberal interpretation since it is assumed that was the intent of Congress.”) 
(citation omitted). 
 40  15 U.S.C § 1635 (2012); see THOMAS & RENUART, supra note 32, § 1.2.1, at 5; see 
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TILA promotes its goals primarily by mandating disclosure 
requirements for various types of credit transactions.  TILA contains 
disclosure requirements for open-end credit loans41—defined as 
“plan[s] under which the creditor reasonably contemplates repeated 
transactions, which prescribes the terms of such transactions, and 
which provides for a finance charge which may be computed from 
time to time on the outstanding unpaid balance”42—as well as closed-
end credit loans,43 which are defined as credit loans that are not 
open-end, such as mortgages.44  For closed-end transactions such as 
mortgages, TILA requires disclosure of the identity of the creditor, 
the amount financed, the finance charge, the annualized percentage 
rate (APR), and more.45  To give force to these disclosure 
requirements, TILA provides consumers with a powerful substantive 
right: the right to rescind certain loan transactions.46  This right 
applies to any consumer credit transaction secured by a principal 
dwelling,47 except for “residential mortgage transactions,” which are 
defined as purchase money mortgages on the consumer’s principal 
dwelling.48 
Congress revised TILA numerous times in the three decades 
since its inception.49  The first amendment affecting rescission rights 
occurred in 1974.50  While the extended rescission right was initially 
 
cases cited supra notes 38, 39.  
 41  15 U.S.C. § 1637 (2012). 
 42  15 U.S.C. § 1602(j) (2012).  
 43  15 U.S.C. § 1638 (2012). 
 44  12 C.F.R. § 226.2(10) (2011); King v. California, 784 F.2d 910, 913 (9th Cir. 
1986) (“The transaction here would qualify as closed-end, because it does not fit any 
of the definitions of an open-end credit transaction.”). 
 45  12 U.S.C. § 1638. 
 46  15 U.S.C. § 1635 (2012). 
 47  Id.  Though the statute does not define “principal dwelling,” the official staff 
interpretations published by the Federal Reserve Board contain some guidance.  12 
C.F.R. § 226, Supp. I at 226.23(a)(1)(1997) (“A consumer can only have one 
principal dwelling at a time . . . .  A vacation or other second home would not be a 
principal dwelling.”). 
 48  12 C.F.R. 226.23(f)(1) (2011).  A “residential mortgage transaction” is defined 
as a “transaction in which a mortgage . . . is created or retained against the 
consumer’s dwelling to finance the acquisition or initial construction of such 
dwelling.”  15 U.S.C. § 1602(w) (2012).  Thus, generally, the rescission right applies 
to refinancing loans and home improvement loans with respect to a borrower’s 
principal dwelling.  Id. 
 49  For an overview of all of the amendments to TILA, see THOMPSON & RENUART, 
supra note 17, § 1.2.1.   
 50  Fair Credit Billing Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, title IV, §§ 404, 405, 412, 88 Stat. 
1517, 1519 (1974). 
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open-ended once triggered, Congress responded to complaints from 
the lending industry by amending the statute to add a three-year time 
limit for rescission—§ 1635(f).51  Congress again tweaked the statute 
in 1980 to limit rescission rights to loans secured by a “principal 
dwelling,” as opposed to a “residence.”52  Despite these minor 
limitations on the rescission right, TILA remained a significant 
source of borrower’s rights after the early amendments.53 
During the early 1990s, TILA’s rescission requirement became 
an important consumer defense against the possibility of 
foreclosure.54  Home equity borrowing had increased and had 
become a primary credit tool.55  As a result of the mass securitization 
of residential mortgages, the homes of many borrowers became 
exposed to financial risk, and rescission became a vital tool for 
consumer protection.56  In addition, the credit industry was still 
concerned about the law, especially after an Eleventh Circuit 
decision, Rodash v. AIB Mortgage Company, interpreted TILA’s 
disclosure requirements in a way that exposed many existing 
mortgages to rescission.57  Thereafter, Congress passed The Truth in 
Lending Act Amendments of 1995 (the “1995 Amendments”).58  The 
1995 Amendments adjusted the disclosure requirements and 
provided retroactive immunity for certain loans exposed to rescission 
 
 51  Jamerson v. Miles, 421 F. Supp. 107, 110 (N.D. Tex. 1976) (“The open-ended 
nature of the rescission right, however, ended on October 28, 1974, when Congress 
amended section 1635 to include a new subsection (f), which imposed a three-year 
limitation on the right to rescind.”).   
 52  Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 612, 94 Stat. 132 (1980).  
 53  THOMPSON & RENUART, supra note 17, § 1.2.2 at 7. 
 54  Id. at § 1.2.5 at 8.  
 55  Id. (citing NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, THE COST OF CREDIT: 
REGULATION, PREEMPTION, AND INDUSTRY ABUSES § 2.4 (4th ed. 2009 and Supp.) 
(discussing the deregulation of the residential mortgage market).  
 56  THOMPSON & RENUART, supra note 17, § 1.2.5 at 8.  A number of questionable 
creditor practices also contributed to a proliferation of TILA violations.  For 
instance, some creditors “unbundled” the costs of originating loans, and instead 
passed the costs onto consumers piece-by-piece without disclosing these costs at the 
initial transaction.  Id.  For a discussion of other creditor practices that result in 
widespread TILA violations and created an impetus behind the 1995 amendments, 
see id. 
 57  Rodash v. AIB Mort. Co., 16 F.3d 1142 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that 
“intangible taxes” were “finance charges” under TILA—a categorization that made 
these charges a disclosure requirement).  The Rodash decision resulted in some 
borrowers rushing to refinance their loans into rescindable mortgage transactions 
because most creditors did not quickly update their disclosure terms to reflect the 
decision.  THOMPSON & RENUART, supra note 17, § 1.2.5 at 8–9.   
 58  Truth in Lending Act Amendments of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-29, 109 Stat. 271 
(1995); THOMPSON & RENUART, supra note 17, § 1.2.5 at 8. 
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by the Rodash decision.59  Important for the right to rescind, the 1995 
Amendments created special rules for rescission claims raised as a 
defense in foreclosure.60  In particular, some of the retroactive 
immunity granted by the law did not apply to these claims, and the 
tolerance level for disclosure violations was made much lower for 
parties seeking rescission.61  Congress’s decision to provide special 
treatment to rescission claims raised in foreclosure and to retain 
rescission as a powerful consumer remedy ensured the importance of 
rescission as a remedy for borrowers who did not receive proper 
disclosure forms.62 
Subsequent amendments related primarily to the disclosure 
requirements and had no effect on the rescission remedy.63  
Nonetheless, the trend of these amendments was in line with the 
purpose of TILA: to protect consumers.  For instance, an otherwise 
pro-creditor64 bankruptcy amendment package in 2005 actually 
heightened some disclosure requirements for certain transactions.65 
Although the 1995 Amendments were considered to be creditor-
friendly in some aspects,66 the 2008 financial crisis provided the 
impetus for further amendments intended to protect consumers.67  
 
 59  Truth in Lending Act Amendments §§ 2, 4.  
 60  Id. at § 8. 
 61  Id.  The 1995 Amendments also limited rescission in foreclosure to only 
certain disclosure violations.   
 62  THOMPSON & RENUART, supra note 17, § 1.2.5 at 9 (“[T]he retention of the 
rescission remedy and the relatively low tolerance for defensive claims re-emphasized 
the particular important of TILA in providing a remedy for borrowers in 
foreclosure.”). 
 63  The Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22, 123 
Stat. 1632 (2009); Higher Education Opportunity Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-315, 122 
Stat. 3078 (2008); Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 
§§ 2502(a), 122 Stat. 2654 (2008) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1638(b)(2)); Bankruptcy 
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, §§ 1301–
1309, 119 Stat. 23 (2005). 
 64  See Timothy Egan, Newly Bankrupt Raking in Piles of Credit Offers, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 11, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/11/national/11credit.html?_r=0. 
 65  Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. 
No. 109–8, §§ 1301–1309, 119 Stat. 23 (2005). 
 66  THOMPSON & RENUART, supra note 17, § 1.2.5, at 9 (“[T]he 1995 amendments 
provided some additional leeway to creditors in making certain TIL disclosures.”).  
The credit-friendly nature of the 1995 amendments should not be overstated, 
however, considering that rescission remained a powerful remedy and rescission 
claims raised in foreclosure, though limited to only certain disclosure violations, were 
provided with lower tolerance for disclosure violations compared to other claims.  See 
supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
 67  See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 1100A, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); Credit Card Accountability Responsibility 
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The crisis was fueled by a mortgage industry collapse caused in large 
part by the mass issuance of loans to borrowers who could not afford 
them.68  TILA’s rescission right became increasingly important as 
foreclosure filings increased.69  Perhaps in response to criticism that 
TILA’s inadequate disclosure requirements were a partial cause of 
the mortgage crisis,70 Congress once again acted to protect consumers 
by amending TILA.71  For instance, the post-financial crisis 
amendments provided further protection to borrowers by requiring 
early disclosures of credit terms for loans secured by a principal 
dwelling.72  Congress also provided a safe-harbor for loan servicers 
from TILA violations to encourage loan modifications in lieu of 
foreclosure.73  And most importantly, an amendment in 2010 created 
and transferred rule-making authority for implementing TILA to an 
agency with a decidedly more consumer-oriented approach.74  
Originally, rulemaking authority to implement TILA was granted to 
the Federal Reserve Board.75  However, in 2010, a Congress interested 
in expanding consumer protection transferred rulemaking authority 
to the newly created CFPB, as part of Dodd-Frank.76  In an early 
 
and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (2009); Prevent 
Mortgage Foreclosure and Enhance Mortgage Credit Availability, Pub. L. No. 111-22, 
§ 201, 123 Stat. 1632 (2009); Higher Education Opportunity Act, Pub. L. 110-315, § 
1101, 122 Stat. 3078 (2008); Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. 
No. 110-289, §§ 2502(a), 122 Stat. 2654 (2008) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 
1638(b)(2)). 
 68  See Sovern, supra note 1. 
 69  Dougherty, supra note 19 (citing an estimate from Kathleen Day, 
spokeswoman for the Center for Responsible Lending, estimating “thousands” of 
rescission cases pending due to the economic crisis).   
 70  Sovern, supra note 13. 
 71  See sources cited, supra note 67. 
 72  Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, § 2502, 
122 Stat. 2654 (2008) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1638(b)(2)).  Previously, the law 
had only required disclosures to be provided “before the credit is extended.”  15 
U.S.C. § 1638(b)(1) (2012).  The Housing and Economic Recovery Act, however, 
amended TILA to require that disclosures be provided before a consumer was 
required to pay an application fee for the credit.  15 U.S.C. § 1638(b)(2)(E) (2012). 
 73  Prevent Mortgage Foreclosure and Enhance Mortgage Credit Availability, Pub. 
L. No. 111-22, § 201, 123 Stat. 1632 (2009). 
 74  Dougherty, supra note 19 (“Since the financial crisis began, the Fed has come 
under criticism for having failed to meet its existing legal mandate to protect 
consumers from deceptive mortgages and other financial products. That track 
record was one reason behind Congress’s push to create an independent consumer 
agency.”).  
 75  Consumer Credit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 105, 82 Stat. 148 
(1968).  
 76  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
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exercise of rulemaking authority, the CFPB has proposed new 
disclosure guidelines to provide borrowers with simplified 
information regarding credit terms.77 
B. The TILA Rescission Process and its Effect on Transactions 
Since its inception, TILA has included a substantive right of 
rescission for the borrowers whose loans are secured by principal 
dwellings.78  This right only applies to loans that are not residential 
mortgage transactions,79 which are secured loans used to finance the 
acquisition of property or the initial construction of property.80  Thus, 
the rescission right applies most often to loans that are refinancing 
arrangements on principal dwellings, and loans that are given to 
finance remodeling efforts on principal dwellings.81  This section 
provides a brief overview of this rescission process and the legal effect 
of rescission. 
1. The Rescission Process 
For the transactions for which the rescission remedy is available, 
the law requires lenders to disclose the existence of a security 
agreement, the borrower’s general right to rescind, the effect of 
rescission, the date on which rescission expires, and the method of 
rescission—with a form for notification of rescission provided.82  To 
help implement TILA, Congress originally granted rulemaking 
authority to the Federal Reserve Board, which promulgated 
influential regulations known as “Regulation Z.”83  The regulations 
provide a sample disclosure form that serves as a guideline to 
 
111-203, § 1100A, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1604(a) (2012) (current 
statute granting TILA rulemaking authority to the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau); THOMPSON & RENUART, supra note 17, § 1.2.11, at 11.  
 77  See Press Release, Consumer Fin. Protection Bureau, Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau Proposes “Know Before You Owe” Mortgage Forms (July 9, 2012), 
available at http://www.consumerfinance.gov/pressreleases/ 
consumer-financial-protection-bureau-proposes-know-before-you-owe-mortgage 
-forms/; see also Sovern, supra note 1. 
 78  15 U.S.C. § 1635 (2012).  See supra note 47 for information regarding the 
definition of “principal dwelling.”  
 79  See citations and accompanying text, supra note 48.  
 80  15 U.S.C. § 1602(w) (2012). 
 81  See citations and accompanying text, supra note 48. 
 82  15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (2012); 12 § C.F.R. 226.23(b)(1) (2011). 
 83  Consumer Credit Protection Act, Pub. L. 90-321, Title I, Ch 1, § 105, 82 Stat. 
148 (May 29, 1968); 12 C.F.R. §§ 226–226.59. Congress has since transferred 
rulemaking authority to the more consumer-oriented Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau. Sources cited supra note 76. 
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Figure 1—Sample Notice of Right to Cancel, Regulation Z85 
 
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO CANCEL 
Your Right to Cancel 
You are entering into a transaction that will result in a 
[mortgage/lien/security interest] [on/in] your home. You have a 
legal right under federal law to cancel this transaction, without cost, 
within three business days from whichever of the following events 
occurs last: 
(1) the date of the transaction, which is __________; or 
(2) the date you received your Truth in Lending disclosures; or 
(3) the date you received this notice of your right to cancel. 
If you cancel the transaction, the [mortgage/lien/security 
interest] is also cancelled. Within 20 calendar days after we receive 
your notice, we must take the steps necessary to reflect the fact that 
the [mortgage/lien/security interest] [on/in] your home has been 
cancelled, and we must return to you any money or property you 
have given to us or to anyone else in connection with this transaction. 
You may keep any money or property we have given you until we 
have done the things mentioned above, but you must then offer to 
return the money or property. If it is impractical or unfair for you to 
return the property, you must offer its reasonable value. You may 
offer to return the property at your home or at the location of the 
property. Money must be returned to the address below. If we do not 
take possession of the money or property within 20 calendar days of 
your offer, you may keep it without further obligation. 
How to Cancel 
If you decide to cancel this transaction, you may do so by notifying us in 
writing, at 
(creditor’s name and business address). 
You may use any written statement that is signed and dated by 
you and states your intention to cancel, or you may use this notice by 
dating and signing below. Keep one copy of this notice because it 
contains important information about your rights. 
If you cancel by mail or telegram, you must send the notice no 
later than midnight of (date) (or midnight of the third business day 
 
 84  See infra Figure 1. 
 85  12 C.F.R. § 226, app. H-8 (2011) (emphasis added).  
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following the latest of the three events listed above). If you send or 
deliver your written notice to cancel some other way, it must be 
delivered to the above address no later than that time. 
 
I WISH TO CANCEL 
____________________ __________ 
Consumer’s Signature Date 
 
Delivery of the rescission notice, along with other disclosure 
forms, is only the first step in the TILA rescission process.86  The law 
provides a three-day window for the borrower to rescind the 
transaction87—the so-called “buyer’s remorse” provision.88  This three-
day window begins at either the close of the transaction or delivery of 
the required disclosure forms, whichever comes later.89  In the event 
that the required disclosure forms are never provided, the borrower’s 
window to exercise the right to rescind is extended for three years 
under § 1635(f).90  This extension begins at either the close of the 
transaction or the sale of the property, whichever occurs first.91 
During the three-day buyer’s remorse window, the statute is clear 
that the borrower may rescind the transaction by “notifying the 
creditor, in accordance with regulations of the [CFPB], of his 
intention to do so.”92  The regulation requires borrowers to “notify 
the creditor of the rescission by mail, telegram or other means of 
written communication.”93  Thus, courts agree that notification is 
sufficient to exercise rescission under the buyer’s remorse provision.94  
Under § 1635(f)’s three-year time extension, in contrast, the manner 
in which a borrower must exercise the right to rescind is not 
 
 86  15 U.S.C. § 1635 (2012). 
 87  15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (2012). 
 88  See Werrett, supra note 22.  
 89  § 1635(a) (2012). 
 90  15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) (2012). 
 91  Id.  The sample notice of right to rescind does not specifically include 
information regarding this extended right to rescind.  See Figure 1.  
 92  § 1635(a). 
 93  12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(2) (2011). 
 94  See, e.g., Aquino v. Pub. Fin. Consumer Disc. Co., 606 F. Supp. 504, 507–08 
(E.D. Pa. 1985) (“Section 1635(a) only requires the obligor to notify the creditor of 
his or her intention to rescind in accordance with regulations promulgated by the 
Board . . . .  If Congress had wished either to place an additional burden on the 
obligor or to grant the creditor additional time to respond to this type of rescission 
notice, it would have done so.”). 
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specifically described.95  On the other hand, § 1635(f) also does not 
contain a requirement that the borrower must file a lawsuit to 
exercise the right.96 
The actual rescission process, once properly exercised by a 
borrower, is governed by a set of default rules located at § 1635(b) 
and the implementing regulation.97  After the borrower exercises the 
right, the lender is obligated, within twenty days, to return any money 
or property that was provided by the borrower back to the borrower.98  
Thus, the onus is on the lender to cancel the security interest.  Only 
then is the borrower required to tender the money given in return 
for the security interest or, if preferable and reasonable, the property 
to the lender, in return for cancellation of the security interest.99  The 
aim of this process is to return each party—the borrower and 
lender—to the status quo before the transaction was consummated.100  
 
 95  Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) (2012) (silent on method of rescission), with 15 
U.S.C. § 1635(a) (2012) (rescission exercised by “notifying the creditor, in 
accordance with regulations of the Bureau, of his intention to do so”).  
 96  15 U.S.C. § 1635(f). 
 97  15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (2012), 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(d) (2011).  The 1995 TILA 
amendments created special rules regarding rescission raised as a shield against 
foreclosure.  THOMPSON & RENUART, supra note 17 § 1.2.5 at 9; see also supra Part II.A.  
These rules limit rescission after foreclosure to one of two disclosure failures: (1) 
when the mortgage broker fee is not included in the finance charge disclosure, and 
(2) when the required rescission rights disclosure forms are not provided.  15 U.S.C. 
§ 1635(i) (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(h) (2011).  
 98  15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (2012) (giving a lender twenty days “return to the obligor 
any money or property given as earnest money, downpayment, or otherwise, and. . . 
take any action necessary or appropriate to reflect the termination of any security 
interest created under the transaction”). 
 99  12 C.F.R. § 226.23(d) (2011).  Some courts, however, have used their 
equitable power over the TILA rescission process to require a showing that the 
borrower has the ability to tender before granting rescission.  See generally, Lea 
Krivinskas Shepard, It’s All About the Principal: Preserving Consumers’ Right of Rescission 
Under the Truth In Lending Act, 89 N.C. L. REV. 171 (2010). 
 100  See McKenna v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp., 475 F.3d 418, 421 (1st Cir. 
2007) (“Rescission essentially restores the status quo ante; the creditor terminates its 
security interest and returns any monies paid by the debtor in exchange for the 
latter’s return of all disbursed funds or property interests.”); Yamamoto v. Bank of 
N.Y., 329 F.3d 1167, 1172 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Quenzer v. Advanta Mortgage 
Corp. USA, 288 B.R. 884, 888 (D. Kan. 2003)) (“[W]ithin the meaning of [TILA], 
‘rescission’ does not mean an annulment that is definitively accomplished by 
unilateral pronouncement, but rather a remedy that restores the status quo ante.”); 
Sosa v. Fite, 498 F.2d 114, 119 (5th Cir. 1974) (“[S]ection 1635(b) is clearly designed 
to restore the parties as much as possible to the status quo ante.”); Bynum v. 
Equitable Mortg. Group, No. 99 CV 2266-SBC-JMF, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6363, at 
*41 (D.D.C. Apr. 7, 2005) (“[§ 1635(b)] is clearly designed to restore the parties as 
much as possible to the status quo ante.”). 
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While this procedure may be modified by court order,101 there is no 
suggestion that a court must oversee the process, which some 
opinions have characterized as a private non-judicial procedure.102  
Indeed, this process has been described as enhancing common law 
rescission to provide more protection for consumers in the specific 
context of mortgages.103 
In terms of damages, the law allows individuals to recover money 
damages for various TILA violations.104  For instance, the lender can 
be subject to a cause of action seeking damages for failing to honor 
rescission.105  TILA allows this by permitting consumers who are 
forced to file suit to have rescission properly effected to recover costs 
and attorneys’ fees.106  The cause of action seeking damages for a 
TILA violation, such as failing to honor the rescission properly 
demanded by the borrower, must be brought within one year of the 
violation.107 
Practically speaking, rescission is often used by borrowers facing 
foreclosure to force a refinancing with an entirely new lender.108  The 
original lender is required to return interest and fees to the 
consumer, and a second lender pays the principal due to the first 
lender while negotiating a new loan with the borrower.109  The end 
result is protecting borrowers from being foreclosed upon on the 
basis of illegal loans, returning the lender to her status quo by having 
the principal repaid, and allowing the borrower to live in the home 
and make payments under a loan that complies with the law. 
 
 101  12 C.F.R. § 226.23(d)(4) (2011). 
 102  See, e.g., Belini v. Wash. Mut. Bank, F.A., 412 F.3d 17, 25 (1st Cir. 2005) 
(“[S]ection 1635 is written with the goal of making the rescission process a private 
one, worked out between creditor and debtor without the intervention of the courts.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 103  See Shepard, supra note 99, at 188 (“TILA’s rescission provisions shift 
significant leverage to consumers by enhancing the protections provided to 
consumers under common law causes of action and remedies.”). 
 104  15 U.S.C. § 1640 (2012). 
 105  Id. at § 1640(a)(1). 
 106  Id. at § 1640(a)(3). 
 107  Id. at § 1640(e). 
 108  Dougherty, supra note 19.  
 109  Id. (“Borrowers usually exercise the right of rescission during a foreclosure or 
other legal proceedings, effectively forcing a loan modification. The borrower seeks a 
new lender, the original lender returns interest and fees, and the principal is repaid 
by the second lender.”). 
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2. Effecting Rescission: When is the Transaction Voided? 
There is also a dispute among the courts as to whether 
exercising the right to rescind in accordance with § 1635(b) and the 
accompanying regulations effectively voids the transaction, or merely 
advances a claim for rescission that must then be confirmed by a 
court.110 
This issue is important because some courts confuse the issue of 
effecting rescission with the issue of exercising the rescission right for 
the purposes of the statute’s time limitations.111  This Comment is 
only concerned with the latter issue.  The statute’s language and 
Regulation Z suggest that the loan (and security interest) is 
automatically voided as a matter of law when the borrower exercises 
the rescission right,112 and some courts have adopted this view.  In 
affirming the borrower’s right to rescind, for instance, the Northern 
District of Illinois, in Lippner v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co.,113 allowed 
rescission as a remedy even after a judgment of foreclosure and sale 
was entered, because the borrower had demanded rescission earlier 
in a notice that was ignored by the lender.114  Under this approach, 
the lender can refuse to honor the rescission and seek a declaratory 
judgment, but if the rescission was valid the lender has an obligation 
to respond by initiating the rescission process, and a failure to do so 
violates TILA.115  Other courts have held that a borrower who 
 
 110  Compare Lippner v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 544 F. Supp. 2d 695 (N.D. 
Ill. 2008) (borrower entitled to rescission when lender failed to respond to rescission 
notice) and 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (2012) (“[W]hen an obligor exercises his right to 
rescind under [§ 1635(a)], he is not liable for any finance or other charge, and any 
security interest given by the obligor, including any such interest arising by operation 
of law, becomes void upon such a rescission.”), with Large v. Conseco Fin. Servicing 
Corp., 292 F.3d 49, 54–55 (1st Cir. 2002) (“[T]he security interest becomes void 
when the obligor exercises a right to rescind that is available in the particular case, 
either because the creditor acknowledges that the right of rescission is available, 
or because the appropriate decision maker has so determined.”). 
 111  See, e.g., Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172, 1187 (10th Cir. 2012); 
Keiran v. Home Capital, 720 F.3d 721 (8th Cir. 2013). 
 112  See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (2012), 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(d)(1) (2011); see cases 
discussed supra note 110.   
 113  Lippner, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 702.  
 114  The Third Circuit has also recently adopted this position.  See Sherzer v. 
Homestar Mortg. Servs., No. 11-4254, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 2486, at *8 (3d Cir. Feb. 
5, 2013) (“[T]he text of § 1635 and its implementing regulation (Regulation Z) 
supports the view that to timely rescind a loan agreement, an obligor need only send 
a valid notice of rescission.”). 
 115  Lippner, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 702 (“Section 1635 states in unqualified terms that 
a creditor must honor an obligor’s valid demand for rescission by taking the 
statutorily enumerated steps within 20 days “except when otherwise ordered by 
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exercises rescission rights “has merely asserted a claim seeking 
rescission.”116  Under this view, rescission is not recognized by the law 
until either the lender honors it, or it is confirmed by a court. 
Though the issue of when rescission is effected is not the 
primary subject of this Comment, it is sometimes confused with 
satisfying the temporal limitation under § 1635(f), which is the 
subject of this Comment.117  For the purposes of exercising rescission 
within three years to satisfy § 1635(f), the moment at which rescission 
is recognized by the law is irrelevant.  Indeed, it is consistent for a 
court to hold that an exercise of rescission did not automatically void 
the transaction, but that it was timely under § 1635(f).118 
III. FROM 1976 TO BEACH: EARLY CASE LAW DEVELOPMENTS 
REGARDING EXERCISING RESCISSION RIGHTS UNDER § 1635(F) 
Since § 1635(f) was enacted in 1976, two distinct issues of 
statutory interpretation have arisen in the courts.  Some cases dealt 
with the method of exercising rescission rights (hereinafter “the 
Exercising Rights cases”) and others with the nature of the time 
limitation under §1635(f): whether it is a strict three-year limitation 
or flexible (“Limitations cases”).  Both lines of cases will be 
summarized in this section.  Then, this section summarizes the 
Supreme Court case that is the definitive Limitations case—Beach v. 
Ocwen Federal Bank119—upon which many courts have improperly 
 
court” . . . .  TILA explicitly states that the obligor’s duty to tender the property to 
the debtor only arises once the creditor’s obligations under [TILA]” are 
completed.”) (internal quotation omitted). 
 116  Moore v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A, 597 F. Supp. 2d 612, 616 (E.D. Va. 2009); see 
also, e.g., Am. Mortgage Network, Inc. v. Shelton, 486 F.3d 815 (4th Cir. 2007); 
Yamamoto v. Bank of N.Y., 329 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2003); In re Merriman, 329 B.R. 
710, 719 (D. Kan. 2005) (“The plain language of the statute indicates that exercising 
the right to rescind is a discrete event; and rescission is a separate discrete event.”). 
 117  See, e.g., Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172, 1187 (10th Cir. 2012).  
This Comment addresses the problem of borrowers who “lose” the rescission right 
after three years after reasonably relying on the notice of intent to rescind form—
which a reasonable borrower believes is sufficient for rescission.  Regardless of 
whether the notice actually effects rescission, this Comment argues that the door to 
the courts should remain open to these borrowers because they have at least satisfied 
the three-year requirement in § 1635(f). 
 118  Gilbert v. Residential Funding LLC, 678 F.3d 271 (4th Cir. 2012) (“We must 
not conflate the issue of whether a borrower has exercised her right to rescind with 
the issue of whether the rescission has, in fact, been completed and the contract 
voided.  The former is the concern of § 1635(f) and Regulation Z, and a borrower 
exercises her right of rescission by merely communicating in writing to her creditor 
her intention to rescind.”). 
 119  523 U.S. 410 (1998).  
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relied in applying its holding to the Exercising Rights issue. 
A. Pre-Beach Cases Interpreting § 1635(f) 
1. The Exercising Rights Cases 
The courts have never agreed on the proper method of 
exercising rescission during the three year time window.  Some of the 
first rulings on this issue were in conflict.  For example, in Clemmer v. 
Liberty Financial Planning, Inc.,120 the Western District of North 
Carolina held that the borrower properly exercised rescission by 
sending a rescission letter to the lender.  However, in Jamerson v. 
Miles,121 the Northern District of Texas dismissed an action because 
the plaintiff failed to file an action seeking enforcement of rescission 
with three years.122 
In later cases, many courts seemed to coalesce around the 
argument that exercising rescission is accomplished by simply 
notifying the lender.  For example, in Rowland v. Novus Financial 
Corp.,123 the District Court of Hawaii allowed a TILA claim when the 
borrower asserted the right to rescind within three years.124  And in 
Rowland v. Magna Millikin Bank, N.A.,125 the Central District of Illinois 
held that the borrowers exercised rescission and effected rescission 
by letter to the lender within three years.  Finally, in Stone v. 
Mehlberg,126 the Western District of Michigan held that the borrowers 
exercised rescission by notifying the lender by letter.127 
Of course, some courts still held to the view that a borrower 
must file an action to satisfy § 1635(f).  For instance, the Third 
Circuit in Smith v. Fidelity Consumer Discount Company128 noted in dicta 
 
 120  467 F. Supp. 272 (W.D.N.C. 1979).  This case applied TILA as it existed before 
the § 1635(f) time limitation was enacted. 
 121  421 F. Supp. 107 (N.D. Tex. 1976). 
 122  Id. at 111. 
 123  949 F. Supp. 1447, 1455 (D. Haw. 1996). 
 124  Id. at 1455 (“Plaintiff asserted his right to rescind [within three years of 
consummation of the loan].  This notice of rescission was timely if, as Plaintiff 
alleges, Defendant did not provide the requisite notice of right to rescind or the 
material disclosures.”). 
 125  812 F. Supp. 875 (C.D. Ill. 1992). 
 126  728 F. Supp. 1341 (W.D. Mich. 1989). 
 127  Id. at 1347 (borrowers “properly exercised their right by informing the 
[lenders] of their intent to rescind by letter”); see also, e.g., McCoy v. Harriman Utility 
Bd., 790 F.2d 493 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that rescission claim survives because 
“Plaintiff mailed her notice of rescission . . . within three years of all relevant dates”). 
 128  898 F.2d 896, 903 (3d Cir. 1990). 
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that a borrower has three years after consummation of a loan “within 
which to bring an action for rescission.”129  In many other cases, the 
issue simply did not arise because a lawsuit seeking rescission was 
filed within the three year window anyway or because the court 
declined to rule on the issue.130  In sum, there was confusion among 
the courts as to the method of exercising rescission under § 1635(f) 
since the inception of TILA. 
2. The Limitations Cases 
Another line of cases arose parallel to the Exercising Rights 
cases, dealing with the issue of the nature of § 1635(f)’s three-year 
time window.  The split in these cases was resolved by the 1998 
Supreme Court decision in Beach.131 
Some of the Limitations cases held that, even outside the three-
year window, rescission could be raised as a defense to foreclosure.  
For example, in Dawe v. Merchants Mortgage & Trust Corp., the 
borrower attempted to demand rescission two years after the lender 
filed suit seeking judgment on the loan. 132  The Colorado Supreme 
Court allowed the rescission claim to survive § 1635(f)’s time limit, 
even though it was raised outside of the three-year time window.133  
The court held that rescission raised as a defense in the nature of 
recoupment is not barred by § 1635(f).134  A number of other courts 
throughout the country reached similar conclusions, characterizing 
rescission claims raised defensively in recoupment actions as 
exceptions to § 1635(f).135  These courts reasoned that an alternative 
reading of the statute “would allow a creditor to wait three years to 
file its suit and thereby defeat the purpose of the Act.”136 
 
 129  Id. 
 130  See, e.g., Hefferman v. Bitton, 882 F.2d 379, 383–84 (9th Cir. 1989) (declining 
to decide whether 1635(f) only requires notice); Dougherty v. Hoolihan, Neils, & 
Boland, 531 F. Supp. 717, 721–22 (D. Minn. 1982). 
 131  See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 132  683 P.2d 796 (Colo. 1984). 
 133  Id. at 801.  
 134  Id. (“[P]etitioners’ demand for rescission constitutes a defense in the nature 
of recoupment and is not barred by the limitations period set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 
1635(f).”). 
 135  See, e.g., In re Barsky, 210 B.R. 683, 685 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1997) (“holding that 
“rescission can be asserted defensively even if it is effected after the § 1635(f) three-
year period has run.”); Westbank v. Maurer, 276 Ill. App. 3d 553, 564 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1995) (“[B]ecause defendant raised her claim for rescission of the mortgage in 
response to plaintiff’s foreclosure action, she was not barred by the three-year 
limitation contained in section 1635(f) of the Act.”).  
 136  Id. 
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Concurrently, other courts were holding that the rescission 
period is strict and that no claims asserted outside the three-year 
period could survive.  These courts explicitly rejected a tolling theory 
for § 1635(f), finding it to be a strict statute that cannot be tolled.137  
Other courts rejected the exception for rescission raised as a defense 
to recoupment, holding that a borrower “cannot revive a time-barred 
claim by characterizing his suit as a defense to an illegal claim under 
the recoupment theory provided by the statute.”138  These courts 
characterized § 1635(f) as a strict repose period for the “right of 
rescission,” but did not rule on whether notification of rescission 
within the repose period satisfies the statute.139 
B. The Supreme Court’s Decision in Beach v. Ocwen Federal Bank 
The major Supreme Court decision concerning § 1635(f) is 
Beach v. Ocwen Federal Bank.140  Beach was decided in 1998, after the 
1995 TILA amendments, and continues to be the primary point of 
reference for courts interpreting § 1635(f).141 
In Beach, the defendant borrowers had taken out a loan secured 
by their home in 1986, and stopped making payments in 1991.142  The 
bank initiated foreclosure proceedings in 1992, and the defendants 
raised rescission as a defense to that action, alleging various 
disclosure violations.143  This rescission defense was raised well outside 
the three-year time limitation imposed by § 1635(f).144  The borrowers 
argued that § 1635(f) only operated as a limitation on borrowers 
bringing rescission claims, and did not bar a defensive rescission 
 
 137  E.g., In re Shaw, 178 B.R. 380, 386 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1994) (tolling the statutory 
rescission period is improper because 1635(f) is a strict time limitation on asserting 
claims). 
 138  Moor v. Travelers Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 632, 634 (5th Cir. 1986) (internal 
quotation removed); Great W. Bank v. Shoemaker, 695 So. 2d 805, 807 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2d Dist. 1997) (“[S]ection 1635 ‘mirrors a statute of repose’ and 
‘unambiguously expresses Congress’s intent to extinguish the statutory right of 
rescission three years after the transaction’s closing.’”) (citation omitted). 
 139  Beach v. Great W. Bank, 670 So. 2d 986, 993 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996), aff’d, 
523 U.S. 410 (1998) (“[T]he statutory right of rescission under TILA expires three 
years after the closing of the transaction and may not be revived as a defense in 
recoupment in an action to collect the debt upon the buyer’s default.”  The court 
did not, howver, rule on how a borrower may properly assert rescission). 
 140  523 U.S. 410 (1998). 
 141  See discussion infra Part III.C.  
 142  Beach, 523 U.S. at 413. 
 143  Id. 
 144  Id.  
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claim raised outside of the three-year window.145  As phrased by the 
Supreme Court, the issue presented was “whether a borrower may 
assert this right to rescind as an affirmative defense in a collection 
action brought by the lender more than three years after the 
consummation of the transaction.”146  In other words, the borrowers 
did not argue that anything they did satisfied the three-year time limit 
imposed by § 1635(f)—instead, they argued that their defense should 
survive even though it was raised outside of the three-year period.147 
Justice Souter, in a unanimous opinion for the Court, began the 
analysis by noting that § 1635(f) “says nothing in terms of bringing an 
action” and instead provides a time period for expiration of the right 
of rescission.148  The Court found that § 1635(f) governs the life of the 
underlying right granted by the statute, and not of a lawsuit’s 
commencement.149  The Court then compared § 1635(f)’s three-year 
time limitation to the one-year statute of limitations for actions 
arising out of TILA violations (“§ 1640(e)”).150  The Court noted that 
§ 1640(e) contains an exception for claims of TILA violations raised 
as a defense in recoupment or set-off actions.151  According to § 
1640(e), claims for recoupment damages can be brought as a defense 
to any action with no statutory time limitation.152  The Court held that 
this indicated that Congress intended to treat § 1635(f)’s rescission 
time limitation differently, because § 1635(f) contains no similar 
exception.153  The opinion reasoned that allowing rescission to be 
raised perpetually as a defense in recoupment actions pursuant to § 
1640(e) would “cloud the title” of mortgages during foreclosure.154  
The Court concluded that § 1635(f)’s three-year time extension must 
be an absolute bar on rescission, raised defensively or otherwise, if 
asserted outside the three-year period.155 
Thus, Beach stands for the proposition that § 1635(f) is a strict 
 
 145  Id. at 415.  
 146  Id. at 411–12. 
 147  See Gilbert v. Residential Funding LLC, 678 F.3d 271, 278 (4th Cir. 2012) 
(“The Beach Court did not address the proper method of exercising a right to 
rescind or the timely exercise of that right.”). 
 148  Beach, 523 U.S. at 417 (emphasis added).  
 149  Id. 
 150  Id. at 418; 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (2012). 
 151  Beach, 523 U.S. at 418.  
 152  15 U.S.C. § 1640(e). 
 153  Beach, 523 U.S. at 418.  
 154  Id.  
 155  Id. 
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three-year limitation, and that even a defense of rescission raised 
after the three-year period is precluded by the statute.156  Subsequent 
cases have interpreted this decision as holding that § 1635(f) is a 
statute of repose,157 even though the Supreme Court never used that 
particular phrase.158  The Court left open the exact method of 
exercising the rescission right within the three-year statutory period—
whether notice to the lender is sufficient, or filing of a lawsuit is an 
additional requirement.159  The Beach Court only affirmatively 
rejected any claims raised outside the three-year period.160  The Court 
addressed the nature of § 1635(f)’s time limitation contemplated by 
the Limitations cases161 but did not resolve the confusion among the 
courts expressed in the Exercising Rights cases.162 
C. The Post-Beach Circuit Split Concerning the Method of Exercising 
the Right to Rescind. 
After Beach, the lower courts continued to split on what a 
borrower must do to properly exercise rescission rights within the 
 
 156  Id. 
 157  A statute of repose bars an action unless it is brought within a certain time 
period after the occurrence of a specified event.  See Bradway v. Am. Nat’l Red Cross, 
992 F.2d 298, 301 (11th Cir. 1993) (“There is a distinct difference between statutes of 
limitations and statutes of repose . . . .  A statute of repose stands as an unyielding 
barrier to a plaintiff’s right of action. The statute of repose is absolute; the bar of the 
statute of limitations is contingent. The statute of repose destroys the previously 
existing rights so that, on the expiration of the statutory period, the cause of action 
no longer exists.”); see also 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 7 (2013) (“Statutes of 
repose and statutes of limitations are sometimes confused . . . .  The distinguishing 
feature between the two is the time at which the respective periods commence.”). 
 158  See, e.g., Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172, 1181 (10th Cir. 2012) 
(quoting Beach, 523 U.S. at 417) (“[T]he [Beach] Court . . . held that [1635(f)] 
‘govern[s] the life of the underlying right [of rescission],’ and is therefore not a 
statute of limitations, but one of repose.”); McOmie-Gray v. Bank of Am. Home 
Loans, 667 F.3d 1325 (9th Cir. 2012); Doss v. Clearwater Title Co., 551 F.3d 634, 638 
(7th Cir. 2008); U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Manzo, 960 N.E.2d 1238, 1245 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1st Dist. 2011) (“The Supreme Court . . .  found that the three-year deadline in 
section 1635(f) was not a statute of limitations but a statute of repose.”).  Courts have 
also held that, as with all statutes of repose, equitable tolling is impossible.  See, e.g., 
Jones v. Saxon Mortg., 537 F.3d 320, 327 (4th Cir. 1998) (“Because § 1635(f) is a 
statute of repose, the time period stated therein is typically not tolled for any 
reason.”) (citation omitted). 
 159  See Gilbert v. Residential Funding LLC, 678 F.3d 271, 278 (4th Cir. 2012) 
(“The Beach Court did not address the proper method of exercising a right to 
rescind or the timely exercise of that right.”). 
 160  Beach, 523 U.S. at 418.   
 161  See discussion supra Part III.A.2. 
 162  See discussion supra Part III.A.1. 
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three-year time window.  Many cases properly allowed borrowers to 
satisfy § 1635(f) by notifying the lender of intent to rescind in 
accordance with the statute’s language and Regulation Z.163  However, 
a majority of cases denied relief to borrowers who notified the lender 
of rescission within three years, if a lawsuit was not also filed within 
the three-year period.164  These courts generally improperly relied 
upon the Beach decision, reading in an extra requirement (filing a 
lawsuit) that is not present in the opinion, statute, or regulations.165  
Most recently, the issue of exercising rescission under TILA has been 
addressed by the Third, Fourth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits. 
1. The Plain Language Approach of the Third and Fourth 
Circuits 
The Fourth Circuit ruled on the proper method of exercising 
rescission rights to satisfy § 1635(f) in Gilbert v. Residential Funding 
LLC,166 while the Third Circuit recently addressed the same issue in 
Sherzer v. Homestar Mortgage Services.167  These courts did not find the 
Beach decision dispositive on the issue.168  The court conducted a 
 
 163  See, e.g., Barnes v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, No. 11-cv-142, 2011 WL 4950111 (D. 
Or. Oct. 18, 2011); Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., No. 07-5040, 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 137315, at *26–35 (E.D. Pa. May 7, 2010); Jozinovich v. JP Morgan Chase 
Bank, N.A., No. C09-03326, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3358, at *16, (N.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 
2010) (rescission permitted because notice of rescission was mailed within three 
years); Jackson v. CIT Group, No. 06-543, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78897, at *2 (W.D. 
Pa. Oct. 30, 2006); Johnson v. Long Beach Mortg. Loan Trust, 451 F. Supp. 2d 16 
(D.D.C. 2006); In re Hunter, 400 B.R. 651 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2009).  
 164  See, e.g., Geraghty v. BAC Home Loans Serv. LP, No. 11-336, 2011 WL 3920248 
(D. Minn. Sept. 7, 2011); Bradford v. HSBC Mortg. Corp., 799 F. Supp. 2d 625 (E.D. 
Va.  2011); DeCosta v. U.S. Bancorp, No. 10-0301, 2010 WL 3824224 (D. Md. Sept. 
27, 2010); Chevy Chase Bank, F.S.B. v. Carrington, No. 6:09-cv-2132-Orl-31GJK, 2010 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17724, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 1, 2010); Falcocchia v. Saxon Mortg., 
Inc., 709 F. Supp. 2d 860, 868 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (“[P]laintiffs did not file a claim 
seeking rescission within the three year period . . . plaintiffs’ allegation that they sent 
a notice of rescission within the three year period is irrelevant.”); Ramos v. 
Citimortgage, Inc., No. CIV. 08-02250, 2009 WL 86744 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2009) 
(“[B]ecause plaintiff filed his Complaint over three years from the date on which he 
consummated his loan, the court is without jurisdiction to consider his claim for 
rescission under TILA.”). 
 165  See, e.g., Carrington, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *7 (citing Beach v. Ocwen Fed. 
Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 418 (1998)) (“15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) operates to extinguish the 
right of rescission itself . . . .  Thus no matter what actions [Lender] took or failed to 
take, [Borrower]’s right to rescind was extinguished . . . well before he filed the 
instant suit.”); see discussion infra Part IV. 
 166  678 F.3d 271 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 167  No. 11-4254, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 2486 (3d Cir. Feb. 5, 2013). 
 168  Gilbert, 678 F.3d at 278 (noting that Beach did not address the issue of how a 
borrower may exercise the rescission right).  
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plain language analysis of § 1635(f) and concluded that in order to 
satisfy § 1635(f), a borrower must simply notify the lender of 
rescission within three years.169 
The bank foreclosed upon the Gilberts within three years of 
refinancing their mortgage.170  After the foreclosure was initiated, but 
before the three-year window had concluded, the borrowers wrote to 
the lender alleging several TILA violations and notifying the lender 
of rescission.171  The lender refused to honor the rescission.172  While 
the Gilberts appealed the foreclosure decision, they filed a separate 
lawsuit seeking rescission.173  They filed the rescission lawsuit outside 
of the three-year window under § 1635(f).174  Though the Gilberts 
were successful in their appeal of the foreclosure, the separate 
rescission action alleging TILA violations was dismissed by a lower 
court as untimely.175  The Gilberts appealed the dismissal of the TILA 
claims, and the case eventually reached the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.176 
There, the Gilberts argued that they exercised the right to 
rescind within the three-year window by sending the letter to the 
lender.177  The Fourth Circuit began its analysis by recognizing that 
nothing in the statute or Regulation Z says anything about requiring 
a borrower to file a lawsuit.178  The court relied on the plain language 
of the statute and the regulation, which both suggest that notification 
is a proper and sufficient exercise of rescission.179  The court also 
properly distinguished the issue of effecting rescission from 
exercising the rescission right, finding that TILA only requires a 
borrower to exercise, but not to effect, rescission within three years.180  
In addition, the court also properly distinguished Beach, finding that 
the decision simply did not address the method of exercising the 
right of rescission.181  Instead, the court noted that Beach addressed 
 
 169  Id. 
 170  Id. at 274.  
 171  Id. 
 172  Id., 678 F.3d at 274. 
 173  Id. at 274–75. 
 174  Gilbert, 678 F.3d. at 274–75. 
 175  Id. at 275. 
 176  Id.  
 177  Id., 678 F.3d. at 276.   
 178  Id. at 277.  
 179  Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(2) (2011). 
 180  Gilbert, 678 F.3d at 277; see discussion supra Part II.B.2. 
 181  Gilbert, 678 F.3d at 278.  
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the extinguishment of the right of rescission after three years, a 
completely separate issue.182  The court concluded that notification of 
rescission is a proper exercise of rescission rights under TILA and 
Regulation Z.183 
In Sherzer v. Homestar Mortgage Services,184 the Third Circuit also 
held that § 1635(f) only requires a borrower to send notice of intent 
to rescind to the lender, rather than file a lawsuit.  The plaintiffs 
obtained two loans, one small and one large, from defendant 
Homestar, but did not receive adequate disclosures.185  Within three 
years of the closing, the plaintiffs sent a letter informing co-defendant 
HSBC (the assignee of the loans) of their intent to rescind both of 
the loans.186  HSBC agreed to rescind the smaller loan, but refused to 
rescind the larger loan.187  The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit seeking a 
declaratory judgment for rescission more than three years after the 
closing, but they argued that the claim was not barred by § 1635(f) 
 
 182  Id. 
 183  Id.  The court then addressed the Gilberts’ claim for damages.  According to 
the court, refusal to honor rescission is a separate TILA violation triggering the one 
year statute of limitations.  Gilbert, 678 F.3d, at 278; 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (2012).  
Because the lawsuit seeking rescission was filed within one year of the Gilberts’ letter 
seeking rescission, the court held that the Gilberts could also seek damages for the 
refusal to honor the rescission, in addition to being entitled to rescission itself.  
Gilbert, 678 F.3d at 278–79. 
 184   No. 11-4254, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 2486 (Feb. 5, 2013).  The procedural 
history of this case is interesting.  Initially, United States Magistrate Judge Elizabeth 
Hey recommended, and the Eastern District Court of Pennsylvania held, that the 
bank’s motion for dismissal be denied, because the statute and regulations only 
require a borrower to provide notice of intent to rescind to satisfy § 1635(f).  Sherzer 
v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., No. 07-5040, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66354 (E.D. Pa. June 
30, 2010); Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., No. 07-5040, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
137315 (E.D. Pa. May 7, 2010).  The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, however, 
subsequently issued an opinion in an unrelated case expressly following the 
restrictive Ninth and Tenth Circuit approaches, reading a filing requirement into § 
1635(f).  Williams v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 410 Fed. App’x 495 (3d Cir. 
2011).  The bank in Sherzer then submitted another motion to dismiss in light of the 
Williams decision, which the district court granted after resolving a “law of the case” 
dispute in the bank’s favor.  Sherzer, 849 F. Supp. 2d.  But when the Sherzer case was 
then appealed, a separate panel of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the 
lower court and adopted a liberal holding similar to the Fourth Circuit’s decision in 
Gilbert, as well as the magistrate judge’s initial recommendation, without even 
mentioning the earlier Williams decision.  Because the original Williams decision is 
also unpublished and because the Sherzer appellate decision is more recent and 
reaches a completely opposite conclusion without mentioning Williams, this 
Comment treats the appellate Sherzer decision as the current view of the Third 
Circuit. 
 185  Sherzer, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 2486, at *3. 
 186  Id. 
 187  Id. 
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because the letter of intent to rescind was sent within three years of 
the closing.188 
The Sherzer opinion analyzed the plain language of the statute of 
regulations and recognized that there is no mention of filing a lawsuit 
or action.189  The opinion concluded that “nothing in the text of the 
statute supports the view that ‘it is the filing of an action in a 
court . . . that is required to invoke the right limited by the TILA 
statute of repose.”190  The court also rejected the bank’s attempt to 
rely on Beach, properly distinguishing the case, and found that 
allowing notice-only rescission would not cloud title.191  The opinion 
concluded that under § 1635(f), “[the right to rescind] expires if it is 
not exercised in three years, but borrowers who have exercised the 
right can file suit after the three-year period has passed.”192 
2. The Eighth and Tenth Circuits’ Restrictive Approach: 
Concern with Clouding the Title of Mortgages, and 
Reliance on Beach 
While the Third and Fourth Circuits properly distinguished 
Beach and found notification of rescission sufficient to satisfy § 
1635(f), the Tenth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion, with 
which the Eighth Circuit subsequently agreed.  In Rosenfield v. HSBC 
Bank, USA,193 the Tenth Circuit held that Beach is dispositive on the 
issue of how borrowers may exercise the rescission right, and read an 
additional implied requirement into the statute—that a borrower 
must not only notify the lender of rescission within three years, but 
must also file a lawsuit enforcing rescission with three years of the 
transaction. 
 
 188  Id. at *4.   
 189  Id. at *11. 
 190  Id. at *16–17 (quoting Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA 681 F.3d 1172 (10th 
Cir. 2012)).  
 191  Sherzer, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 2486 at *20–26, *31–36.  
 192  Id. at *28.  The Sherzer court went further than the Fourth Circuit in Gilbert, 
holding that a valid written notice immediately effects rescission and voids the 
agreement, in addition to constituting a satisfactory exercise of the rescission right.  
Id. at *8–9 (“[T]o timely rescind a loan agreement, an obligor need only send a valid 
notice of rescission . . . .  Although the Lenders’ amici have raised practical concerns 
that may arise if obligors are permitted to rescind their loans through written notice 
alone, we find ourselves constrained by the text of § 1635 in spite of those 
concerns.”).  The Gilbert court, on the other hand, held that rescission only occurs 
after either the bank agrees to rescind or a court enters an order declaring the loan 
rescinded, distinguishing between effecting rescission and satisfying § 1635(f).  
Gilbert v. Residential Funding LLC, 678 F.3d 271, 277 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 193  681 F.3d 1172 (10th Cir. 2012).  
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Ms. Rosenfield notified the lender that she intended to rescind 
the transaction about two years after it refinanced on her home.194  
She claimed that numerous disclosures were not made, including 
information on rescission rights, adjustable rates, and finance 
charges.195  After Ms. Rosenfield defaulted, the lender sought to force 
a sale of the property by filing a motion with the trial court.196  Ms. 
Rosenfield raised rescission as a defense to this proceeding before the 
three-year time window under § 1635(f) had closed.197  After a 
foreclosure sale was ordered, the Rosenfields commenced a separate 
action seeking, among other claims, a declaratory judgment deeming 
the loan rescinded.198 
Ms. Rosenfield argued that she satisfied § 1635(f)’s time limit 
when she notified the lender of rescission.199  The court rejected Ms. 
Rosenfield’s argument on two grounds.  First, the court found the 
Supreme Court decision in Beach to be “dispositive” of the question of 
exercising rescission.200  It described § 1635(f)’s three-year extension 
as a strict repose period that precludes satisfaction by merely 
notifying the lender of rescission.201  As support for this, the court 
characterized the rescission right as one that can only be effected “by 
invoking the power of the courts.”202  Thus, Ms. Rosenfield did not 
 
 194  Id. at 1175–76.  
 195  Id. at 1176.  
 196  Id.  The Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure provide an expedited judicial 
foreclosure proceeding, allowing a secured creditor to file a verified motion with a 
trial court to order the sale of the property.  C.R.C.P. 120.  It is in this special 
proceeding that Ms. Rosenfield raised rescission as a defense. 
 197  Rosenfield, 681 F.3d at 1176.  This is a key factual distinction with Beach.  In 
Beach, the borrower raised rescission as a defense after the three year window had 
expired.  See Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, at 413 (1998).  The Tenth 
Circuit’s reliance on Beach in this different context is demonstrative of the confusion 
between the issue of the nature of the three year time limitation—whether it is strict 
or can be tolled—and the issue of how to exercise the rescission right for the 
purpose of § 1635(f).  See discussion supra Parts III.A.1, III.A.2. 
 198  Rosenfield, 681 F.3d 1172, at 1176. 
 199  Id. at 1182.  Ms. Rosenfield also argued that she satisfied the statute by raising 
rescission as a defense in the foreclosure proceeding, but that is not the subject of 
this comment.  Nevertheless, the court rejected this argument as well.   
 200  Id.  
 201  Id. On the other hand, the opinion noted in dicta that if the lender actually 
effectively responds to the rescission notice, then it may satisfy § 1635(f)’s time limit 
without need for judicial intervention.  Id. at 1183, n.8. 
 202  Id. at 1183.  The Rosenfield court relied on case law concerning statutes of 
repose ruled upon in other contexts and upon the common understanding that a 
statute of repose bars claims—the filing of a lawsuit.  Id. at 1182–83.  The Supreme 
Court in Beach, however, never used the term “statute of repose” and there are other 
limitation statutes that limit the time for an assertion of a right without specifically 
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satisfy § 1635(f) because she did not file a lawsuit within three years, 
even though she notified the lender within the prescribed time 
period.203 
The court also rejected Ms. Rosenfield’s argument on contract 
principles.204  It first compared TILA’s rescission remedy to the 
common law rescission process.205  The court found the TILA 
rescission process analogous to common law rescission, and that the 
underlying purpose behind both is “remedial economy.”206  In other 
words, the purpose of rescission is merely to restore the parties to 
their positions before the transaction occurred, which is different 
from the “compensatory goal of a damages award.”207  The court 
reasoned that rescission is not appropriate, therefore, if enforcement 
is unnecessarily difficult under the circumstances.208  It concluded 
that allowing borrowers to exercise rescission by notifying lenders 
would complicate enforcement.209  Specifically, the court was troubled 
by the prospect of a borrower notifying the lender of rescission, but 
then waiting for some indeterminate time to seek judicial 
enforcement of the rescission—this possibility would “cloud a bank’s 
title on foreclosure.”210 
The court then contended with the plain meaning of the statute 
and the regulations.211  It held that the language of § 1635 and 
Regulation Z does require borrowers to notify lenders of rescission, 
but that this was not sufficient to exercise the right.212  Instead, with 
little analysis, the court held that notifying the lender is merely a 
predicate act to exercising the right of rescission, which is 
accomplished itself by filing a lawsuit.213  Confusing exercising the 
rescission right with effecting rescission, it concluded that allowing a 
borrower to unilaterally exercise the right to rescind would 
 
referring to filing a lawsuit.  See discussion infra Part IV.C. 
 203  Rosenfield, 681 F.3d at 1188 (“[N]otice, by itself, is not sufficient to exercise (or 
preserve) a consumer’s right of rescission under TILA. The commencement of a 
lawsuit within the three-year TILA repose period was required.”).  
 204  Id. at 1184–85.   
 205  Id. at 1184.   
 206  Id.   
 207  Id. 
 208  Id. 
 209  Rosenfield, 681 F.3d  at 1185.  
 210  Id.  at 1185, 1186 (quoting Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, at 418–19 
(1998)).  
 211  Id. at 1185–87.   
 212  Id. at 1185.   
 213  Id. 
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impermissibly enlarge the time period for rescission and would cloud 
the title of property indefinitely.214 
In Keiran v. Home Capital, the Eighth Circuit agreed with the 
Tenth Circuit’s conclusion in Rosenfield.215  The Keiran decision 
resolved two consolidated cases involving the satisfaction of TILA’s 
period for rescission.216  Both the plaintiffs—the Slobeniaks and 
Keirans—showed that the bank failed to comply with TILA disclosure 
requirements by not providing multiple copies of certain disclosure 
statements.217  In the Keiran case, notification of rescission was 
delivered to the bank mortgagee and servicer within three years from 
the defective disclosure delivery, but the banks waited three months 
to respond—conveniently for the bank, this response happened to be 
issued right after the three year period for rescission had expired.218  
The Slobeniaks also notified the mortgagee within the three-year 
period.219  Both the Keirans and Slobeniaks sued to enforce the 
rescission after the three-year period had expired.220 
The Keiran decision reached the same conclusion as the 
Rosenfield court, holding that both plaintiffs’ actions were barred.  
The court based its opinion on Rosenfield’s reasoning—the Keiran 
court engaged in a similar reading of the statute and the Beach 
decision, and cited, in support, Rosenfield’s application of the public 
policy in favor of “remedial economy” in rescission actions.221  To the 
court, allowing plaintiffs to exercise rescission through notice would, 
borrowing a phrase from Beach and the Tenth Circuit, result in 
“casting a cloud on the property’s title.”222  Therefore, the court 
concluded that the statute explicitly requires the filing of a lawsuit to 




 214  Id. at 1187.   
 215  Keiran v. Home Capital, 720 F.3d 721 (8th Cir. 2013). 
 216  Id. at 724. 
 217  Id. at 724–25. 
 218  Id. at 725.  
 219  Id. at 724.  
 220  Id. at 724–25.  
 221  Keiran, 720 F.3d at 726–29.  
 222  Id. at 728. 
 223  Id.  
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3. The Ninth Circuit’s Reliance on Beach to Require 
Borrowers to File a Lawsuit 
The Ninth Circuit also recently ruled on the method of 
exercising rescission for the purposes of § 1635, in McOmie-Gray v. 
Bank of America Home Loans.224  The court reached the same restrictive 
outcome as the Rosenfield court, but produced a less detailed opinion.  
The court found Beach dispositive in ruling that a borrower must file 
a lawsuit within three years to satisfy § 1635. 
In McOmie-Gray, the plaintiff, Ms. McOmie-Gray, closed a first 
deed trust loan in 2006 and was provided with various disclosure 
documents to sign.225  The lender failed to inform her of the date on 
which this right to rescind would expire, a key disclosure 
requirement.226  Two years after the loan was consummated, she sent 
a letter to the lender seeking to rescind the loan, but the bank 
refused rescission.227  Instead, according to Ms. McOmie-Gray, the 
bank negotiated with her for over a year regarding the rescission.228  
After these negotiations failed, she filed suit to rescind the loan, 
which at that point was outside of § 1635(f)’s three-year time 
period.229 
The McOmie-Gray court’s sparse analysis first addressed the legal 
effect of rescission under TILA.  The court found that notifying the 
lender merely advances a claim for rescission, and that rescission is 
not automatic upon notification.230  The court then held Beach 
dispositive, as well as Ninth Circuit precedent establishing § 1635(f) 
as a statute of repose, and thus rejected Ms. McOmie’s claim.231  She 
had argued that the lender’s failure to honor the rescission notice 
extended the time period for seeking rescission by another year, but 
the court rejected this, relying on the Supreme Court’s 
characterization of  § 1635(f) as a strict limitation on the rescission 
right.232  The court did not distinguish between deciding upon the 
legal effect of rescission on the loan agreement and the effect of 
 
 224  667 F.3d 1325 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 225  McOmie-Gray v. Bank of Am. Home Loans, 667 F.3d 1325, 1326 (9th Cir. 
2012).   
 226  Id.; see supra Figure 1; 12  C.F.R. § 226.23(b)(1) (2011). 
 227  McOmie-Gray, 667 F.3d at 1326–27.  
 228  Id. at 1327. 
 229  Id. 
 230  Id. 
 231  Id. at 1329.  
 232  Id. 
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exercising rescission for the purposes of § 1635(f).233  Instead, it 
seemed to hold that because notifying the lender does not 
completely effect rescission of the loan agreement, it is also not an 
exercise of the rescission right. 
IV. BORROWERS SHOULD BE ABLE TO SATISFY § 1635(F)’S THREE-YEAR 
TIME LIMIT ON RESCISSION BY NOTIFYING THE LENDER OF RESCISSION 
Courts should not read additional burdensome requirements for 
borrowers into TILA.  The recent trend of requiring borrowers to file 
a lawsuit to satisfy § 1635(f)’s three-year limit for rescission is a prime 
example of judicial activism overriding the plain language of a statute 
and even conflicting with the statute’s explicitly stated purpose.  As 
the Third and Fourth Circuits concluded, § 1635(f) only requires 
borrowers to exercise rescission within three years of consummating 
the transaction, and the rescission rights of borrowers must be 
protected if they notify the lender of intent to rescind in accordance 
with § 1635(f) and its accompanying regulation within three years. 
A. A Rule that Borrowers May Exercise Rescission via Notification is 
Consistent with Congressional Intent and is Sensible Policy 
Section 1635(f) must be read in the light most favorable to the 
consumer to be consistent with congressional intent.  Moreover, 
allowing borrowers to satisfy § 1635(f) via notification will not in any 
way cloud the title of mortgages during foreclosure.  And finally, a 
broad reading of § 1635(f) that allows borrowers to satisfy the three-
year window via notification is sensible public policy. 
1. Exercise of Rescission by Notification is Consistent with 
Congress’s Intent to use TILA and Regulation Z to 
Protect Consumers   
Courts generally agree that TILA is a remedial statute.234  Its 
stated purpose is “to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms” 
and “to protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit 
billing and credit card practices.235  Given TILA’s remedial nature, 
 
 233  McOmie-Gray, 667 F.3d at 1327–29.  The McOmie-Gray court did not seem to 
consider that the notification of rescission itself is what may satisfy § 1635(f)’s time 
restriction.  Instead, the court took it as a matter-of-course that Beach’s holding 
requires borrowers to file lawsuits to exercise rescission, which is an incorrect reading 
of Beach.  See discussion supra Part III.B, infra Part IV.B.2.  
 234  See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 235  15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2012); see also Littlefield v. Walt Flanagan & Co., 498 F.2d 
1133, 1136 (10th Cir. 1974) (quoting N. C. Freed Co. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. 
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courts have also agreed that the statute should be interpreted 
liberally to protect consumers.236 
In addition to the well-established policy goals of TILA, 
developments in the law reflect Congress’s continuing concern with 
ensuring that borrowers’ rescission rights remain strong.  Since TILA 
became law in 1968, Congress has had numerous opportunities to 
amend the rescission right but has chosen to keep the protection 
intact.237  And even after the 1995 Amendments sought to make 
compliance with disclosure requirements easier for lenders, 
rescission remained a powerful consumer protection.238  Congress had 
another chance to revisit TILA when it passed Dodd-Frank, a piece of 
legislation aimed at protecting consumers from abusive financial 
services practices.239  Rather than limit borrower’s rights in any way, 
Dodd-Frank’s main impact on TILA was to transfer rulemaking 
authority away from the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) to the newly 
created, consumer-protection focused Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (CFPB).240 
This transfer of power has had a great impact on the direction of 
TILA.  Under pressure from lenders, the FRB had proposed making 
rescission more difficult under the statute’s default rules by requiring 
borrowers to first tender the amount due—reversing the normal 
process for TILA rescission.241  Before these rules could be 
implemented, however, Congress transferred rule making authority 
to the CFPB, effective July 2011.242  The CFPB rejected the FRB’s 
lender-friendly attempt to change the rules, and instead issued an 
 
Reserve Sys., 473 F.2d 1210, 1214 (2d Cir. 1973)) (“The Act . . . designed to prevent 
‘unscrupulous and predatory creditor practices’ . . . is remedial.”).  
 236  See cases cited, supra note 39. 
 237  See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 238  Id.; THOMPSON & RENUART, supra note 17, § 1.2.5, at 9 (“[T]he 1995 
amendments provided some additional leeway to creditors in making certain TIL 
disclosures.”). 
 239  See Preamble to Dodd-Frank, supra note 16. 
 240  Id., § 1100A; see 15 U.S.C. §1604(a) (2012) (current statute granting TILA 
rulemaking authority to the CFPB); see also THOMPSON & RENUART, supra note 17, § 
1.2.11, at 11; FALL 2011 STATEMENT OF REGULATORY PRIORITIES, 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/regulations 
/fall-2011-statement-of-regulatory-priorities/ (“[T]he purpose of the CFPB is to 
implement and enforce Federal consumer financial laws consistently for the purpose 
of ensuring that all consumers have access to markets for consumer financial 
products and services and that such markets are fair, transparent, and competitive.”).  
 241  75 Fed. Reg. 58539, 58700–58704 (Sept. 24, 2010); see also Dougherty, supra 
note 19; discussion supra Part II.B.1. 
 242  Id. 
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interim final order affirming the default practice that the consumer 
must tender only after the creditor has canceled the security 
interest.243  Though the CFPB has proposed rule changes to 
implement the Dodd-Frank regulations and simplify disclosure 
requirements, it has rejected the Board’s last-ditch effort to limit 
rescission rights and has not once proposed limiting rescission 
rights.244  Congress’s transfer of authority from the FRB to the CFPB 
represents its continuing intent to promote the consumer protections 
provided by statutes such as TILA, including the right to rescind.  
Therefore, TILA must continue to be interpreted with Congress’s 
goal of protecting the consumer in mind. 
2. Allowing Borrowers to Exercise Rescission via 
Notification Will not Cloud the Title of Mortgages 
The Rosenfield court was especially concerned with the issuing of 
clouded mortgage titles, first expressed by the Supreme Court in 
Beach.245  However, while the issue Beach dealt with did have serious 
implications for clouding the title of mortgages, that concern is not 
present in the context of borrowers exercising the rescission right. 
If a borrower exercises the rescission right by notifying the 
creditor, one of two things will happen.  First, the lender may honor 
the rescission by complying with the procedures outlined in the 
statute and Regulation Z.246  The issue would be resolved without 
involving the court.247  Alternatively, the lender may not honor the 
rescission.  In this scenario, the borrower would obviously cease 
 
 243  Official Comment to Interim Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 79768, 79996 (Dec. 22, 
2011) (Supplement Part I to 1026) (“Once the creditor has fulfilled its obligations 
under § 1026.23(d)(2), the consumer must tender to the creditor any property or 
money the creditor has already delivered to the consumer.”). 
 244  See Press Release, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Proposes “Know 
Before You Owe” Mortgage Forms, supra note 77; see also Sovern, supra note 1. 
 245  See discussion supra Part III.C.2. 
 246  See discussion supra Part II.B.1.  For a real world example of a bank agreeing to 
rescind without the courts, see Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., No. 11-4254, 2013 
U.S. App. LEXIS 2486, at *3 (3d Cir. Feb. 5, 2013) (“On May 11, 2007—less than 
three years after the closing date—the Sherzers’ counsel . . .  informed the Lenders 
that the Sherzers were exercising their right to rescind the loan agreements under 15 
U.S.C. § 1635.  HSBC agreed to rescind the smaller of the two loans.”). 
 247  As noted earlier, a lender must begin to take action to reflect the termination 
of the security interest within twenty days of receiving the notice of intent to rescind, 
ensuring the rapid commencement of the non-judicial rescission process.  15 U.S.C. 
§ 1635(b) (2012).  Moreover, this process would not cloud title—under TILA, the 
lender and borrower would necessarily engage in steps that result in the complete 
removal of the encumbrance from the property. See citations supra, notes 97–103. 
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payments on the mortgage if he or she believes it is rescinded.  The 
borrower may decide to take affirmative action to seek judicial 
enforcement of the rescission.  Or, after repeated missed payments, 
the lender would pursue foreclosure, and the issue would be litigated 
and resolved before the judgment and sale would be allowed to 
proceed. 
The only effect of allowing borrowers to exercise rescission this 
way is that if there are TILA violations, the borrower would be 
protected from foreclosure on an illegal loan.248  If there are no TILA 
violations, they would be resolved during litigation as part of the 
foreclosure proceeding—an inevitable outcome after the borrower 
ceases payments—and the title will be clear.249  In the hard-to-imagine 
scenario where a borrower exercises rescission, but does not cease 
payments in an attempt to fool the lender, the borrower will likely be 
equitably estopped from asserting rescission as a defense, just as the 
borrower would be estopped under common law rescission.250  
Indeed, at common law when a party rescinds a contract she is bound 
to adhere to the rescission.251  Under any scenario, then, it is hard to 
imagine how allowing the borrower to exercise rescission via 
notification clouds the title of mortgages.252 
 
 248  See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (“When an obligor exercises his right to rescind under 
subsection (a) of this section, he is not liable for any finance or other charge, and 
any security interest given by the obligor, including any such interest arising by 
operation of law, becomes void upon such a rescission.”). 
 249  Indeed, most of the cases involved in the Circuit Split that this comment 
addresses, all dealing with rescission, were connected to already-existing foreclosure 
actions.  See discussion supra Part III.C.  
 250  17B C.J.S. Contracts § 647 (2013) (“An election to rescind the contract must be 
made by the party who has the right to rescind, and once the election is made, that 
party must adhere to it.”); 31 C.J.S. Estoppel and Waiver § 159 (2013) (“The doctrine 
of equitable estoppel precludes a person from maintaining a position or attitude 
which is inconsistent with another position or attitude sought to be maintained at the 
same time or which was asserted at a previous time.”). 
 251  Grymes v. Sanders, 93 U.S. 55, 62 (1876) (“Where a party desires to rescind 
upon the ground of mistake or fraud, he must, upon the discovery of the facts, at 
once announce his purpose, and adhere to it.  If he be silent, and continue to treat the 
property as his own, he will be held to have waived the objection, and will be conclusively bound 
by the contract, as if the mistake or fraud had not occurred.  He is not permitted to play fast 
and loose.  Delay and vacillation are fatal to the right which had before subsisted.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 252  It is important to note that exercising the rescission right is not the same as 
effecting rescission.  See discussion supra Part II.B.2.  While the issue of when the 
rescission is effected does indeed affect the mortgage—if rescission is effected 
unilaterally by notice, then some mortgages will have no force of law without the 
lender knowing—the issue of when the rescission right is exercised does not affect 
the mortgage title. 
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The Beach Court clearly intended to prevent rescission from 
clouding the title of mortgages during foreclosure.253  Indeed, it 
accomplished this quite effectively by precluding tolling of § 1635(f) 
and construing it strictly.254  When using the “cloud the title” 
language, the Court addressed whether to allow rescission claims to 
be raised at any time as defenses to recoupment action.255  In other 
words, the Court addressed whether an exception can be made to 
§ 1635(f)‘s three-year window, and answered that question negatively 
to prevent mortgage titles from being clouded.256  After Beach, the 
rescission right may not be asserted—whether as a filed claim, a 
notice of rescission, or as a defense to recoupment—after the three-
year period.257  The Court simply did not address the method of 
exercising rescission within the three-year period.  The issue of 
clouding title of mortgages is inapplicable to such rescissions.258  
Courts should not create additional statutory requirements in a 
misguided attempt to promote Beach’s principles, because it involved 
an entirely separate issue. 
3. Considerations of Public Policy Call for Allowing 
Borrowers to Exercise Rescission via Notification 
It is sensible policy to allow notification of rescission to 
constitute an exercise of rescission.  The housing bubble that 
preceded the foreclosure crisis was precipitated by many borrowers 
accepting loans that they could not hope to repay; some argue that a 
primary cause of this was the inadequacy of TILA’s disclosure 
requirements.259  While the adequacy of the disclosure requirements 
has been questioned,260 those consumers who have not received the 
disclosures required by law are often left with rescission as the sole 
way to keep their home and obtain a loan they can actually repay.  
 
 253  Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 418 (1998). 
 254  See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 255  Beach, 523 U.S. at 418. 
 256  Id.; see also Jones v. Saxon Mortg., 537 F.3d 320, 327 (4th Cir. 1998) 
(“[A]llowing tolling under § 1635(f) and permitting a party to rescind after a 
foreclosure sale would create uncertainty in any chain of title of real estate 
purchased from a foreclosure sale. Real estate purchased from a foreclosure sale 
would be less marketable if purchasers could somehow later be divested of title. 
Similarly, title to real estate purchased from a foreclosure sale would be clouded.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 257  Beach, 523 U.S. at 418. 
 258  Jones, 537 F.3d at 327.   
 259  Sovern, supra note 1; Sovern, supra note 13.  
 260  Id. 
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Indeed, as foreclosure filings increased during the economic crisis, 
rescission became an increasingly powerful tool for consumers.261  
Thus, as the number of foreclosure filings increased, so have the 
number of rescission cases.262  As a result of these considerations, it is 
in the public’s interest to ensure that consumers who have been 
misled as a result of the practices of the mortgage industry have 
recourse to rescind these faulty transactions.  Any policy to the 
contrary should come from Congress, not the courts, due to the 
prevalence and complicated nature of the problem. 
Moreover, the statutory scheme articulated by TILA and 
Regulation Z works most efficiently when consumers can satisfy the 
limitations period by merely notifying the lender of rescission.  
Requiring borrowers to file a lawsuit to satisfy the limitations period is 
burdensome to the very consumers that Congress intended to 
protect.  Under the statutory scheme, lenders are given twenty days to 
void the security transaction, after which point the borrower must 
tender payment.263  Reading § 1635(f) to require borrowers to file a 
lawsuit complicates this process further.  Filing a lawsuit is costly,264 
and borrowers who have been saddled with loans that they cannot 
repay should not be required to outlay money to initiate a lawsuit.265  
TILA recognizes the precarious position these borrowers are in, 
which is why its default rules only require tender of payment after the 
lender voids the security interest—a clear reversal of the traditional 
common law rescission process.266  Requiring borrowers to initiate 
 
 261   The Fed and Foreclosures, supra note 20 (describing rescission as “the most 
effective legal tool that borrowers have to fight foreclosures”). 
 262  Dougherty, supra note 19 (citing an estimate from Kathleen Day, 
spokeswoman for the Center for Responsible Lending, estimating “thousands” of 
rescission cases pending due to the economic crisis). 
 263  15 U.S.C. § 1635 (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(d) (2011).   
 264  How Much Do Lawsuits Cost?, California Labor and Employment Law Blog (last 
visited Apr. 4, 2013), http://www.calaborlaw.com/2008/09/26/how-much-do 
-lawsuits-cost/. 
 265  TILA is a fee-shifting statute.  15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3).  Nonetheless, filing a 
lawsuit remains a huge financial risk for borrowers in the event that the case is lost or 
a contingent-fee attorney is unavailable.   
 266   Shepard, supra note 99; discussion infra Part IV.B.3.  Some courts have 
required a borrower to make a showing that she will be able to tender payment, 
before they will recognize rescission.  See generally Shepard, supra note 99.  Courts are 
not always involved in rescission, however, and not all courts require a showing of 
tender.  See discussion supra Part II.B.1.  In any case, the borrower does not have to 
actually tender any amount until after the security interest has been voided.  
Moreover, in many cases the borrower will negotiate a new loan with a new lender 
who will provide the tender to the original lender.  See Dougherty, supra note 19. 
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litigation to satisfy the limitations period would upset this delicate 
balance.  Indeed, neither the statute nor the regulation requires a 
court to oversee the rescission process.267  The statutory scheme has 
been described as an enhancement of common law rescission.268  The 
purpose of § 1635 is to allow rescission without judicial intervention, 
and requiring borrowers to file a lawsuit to satisfy the limitation 
period would completely frustrate that purpose.269  Furthermore, the 
regulatory requirement that a consumer send a notice of intent to 
rescind form to the lender would be superfluous if the only way a 
consumer could exercise rescission is by filing a lawsuit, because 
service of process as part of the lawsuit also constitutes sufficient 
notice.270 
Another concern is that without exercise via notification, banks 
violating TILA could simply not respond to a borrower’s letter, or 
stonewall until the three-year period expires and then foreclose.271  
The facts alleged in the McOmie-Gray272 case are a perfect example of 
this.273  The bank in that case responded to the notice of rescission by 
negotiating with Ms. McOmie until the limitations period expired.274  
Ms. McOmie-Gray was therefore precluded from a remedy for any 
disclosure violations.275  A rule that encourages lenders to ignore 
letters of rescission or to stonewall until the limitations period has 
expired is unacceptable given TILA’s broad objective of protecting 
 
 267  See discussion supra Part II.B.1. 
 268  Shepard, supra note 99, at 188.   
 269  See, e.g., Belini v. Wash. Mut. Bank, FA, 412 F.3d 17, 25 (1st Cir. 2005) 
(“[S]ection 1635 is written with the goal of  making the rescission process a private 
one, worked out between creditor and debtor  without the intervention of the 
courts.”); Andrews v. Chevy Chase Bank, 545 F.3d 570, 573–574 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(“TILA rescission is therefore considered a purely personal remedy . . . .  It is 
intended to operate privately, at least initially, ‘with the creditor and debtor working 
out the logistics of a given rescission.’”) (quoting McKenna v. First Horizon Home 
Loan Corp., 475 F.3d 418, 421 (1st Cir. 2007)). 
 270  See supra Figure 1; 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(b)(1)(iii) (2011).  
 271  See Patrick Pulatie, TILA and RESPA Rescission Ineffective in Real-World Foreclosure 
Defense, I AM FACING FORECLOSURE BLOG (Aug. 13, 2009), 
http://iamfacingforeclosure.com/blog/2009/08/13 
/tila-and-respa-rescission-ineffective/ (“The lender will respond [to a demand for 
rescission letter] in one of two ways: (a) ignore the letter altogether, or (b), send a reply 
where they deny that there are any violations of TILA and that they refuse to honor 
rescission.”) (emphasis added). 
 272  McOmie-Gray v. Bank of Am. Home Loans, 667 F.3d 1325, 1326 (9th Cir. 
2012).   
 273  See discussion of the facts of McOmie-Gray, supra Part III.C.3. 
 274  McOmie-Gray, 667 F.3d at 1326. 
 275  Id. 
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consumers from deceptive lenders.276 
Finally, providing two separate methods of exercising the 
rescission right—the treatment of each depending on whether the 
right is exercised within the first three days or within the extended 
three-year window—is likely to confuse consumers. 277  The current 
rule requires the notice of intent to rescind to include how to 
exercise the right to rescind, and for the lender to include a form of 
rescission with the lender’s address on it.278  The model form 
provided by the regulations clearly indicates that rescission is 
exercised by simply sending the form to the lender within three 
days.279  Consumers are given clear instructions to exercise rescission 
by notifying the creditor, and courts should not read additional 
requirements that do not appear in the statute, regulations, or notice 
forms.  For a court to impose additional requirements on consumers 
through judicial decree unfairly burdens those consumers who 
reasonably on the clear instructions they are provided. 
B. The Plain Language of the Statute Supports Exercise of Rescission via 
Notification, and this Interpretation is Consistent with Supreme 
Court Precedent and the Common Law 
After applying a plain language analysis relying solely on the 
words of the statute and accompanying regulation, it is clear that § 
1635(f) only requires borrowers to exercise the rescission right via 
notification within three years. 
1. A Plain Language Reading Supports Exercise of 
Rescission via Notification 
It is an axiom of statutory interpretation that courts initially 
“presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means 
in a statute what it says there.”280  Thus, the starting point of any 
statutory analysis is the language of the statute itself.281  To aid in 
 
 276  See discussion supra Part IV.A.1. 
 277  A proposed rule by the Federal Reserve Board noted that “[c]onsumers were 
confused when presented with a single disclosure that provided information about 
the three-business-day right to rescind and an extended right to rescind . . . .”  75 
Fed. Reg. 58539 (Sept. 24, 2010). 
 278  12 C.F.R. § 226.23(b)(1)(iii) (2011). 
 279  See supra Figure 1. 
 280  Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992). 
 281  Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 835 (1990) 
(quoting Consumer Product Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 
(1980)) (“Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that 
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understanding statutory language, the statute must be read in context 
with all of its various provisions.282  Moreover, the Supreme Court has 
noted that courts should resist reading words into a statute when its 
plain meaning appears on its face.283  The Court has also stated that 
when a statute prescribes action by a particular mode, it precludes 
action by alternative modes not mentioned in the statute.284 
In addition, the right of action created by § 1635 and § 1640 did 
not exist at common law.285  Though rescission rights generally do 
exist at common law,286 the right to rescind in response to TILA 
disclosure violations is statutorily-created.  Because TILA created the 
right of rescission, any limitations on the right should be discerned 
from the statute itself.287  Before limiting a statutory right, therefore, 
courts should rely upon the contours of that right as defined by the 
statute. 
Applying these principles to the language of § 1635 reveals that 
the statute simply states that the right of rescission is exercised via 
notification of intent to rescind to the lender.  Though § 1635(f) 
itself is silent as to the proper method of exercising rescission, read in 
context it is clearly an extension of the same right guaranteed by the 
buyer’s remorse provision.288  In reference to the three-day buyer’s 
remorse rescission, § 1635(a) states that a borrower may rescind the 
transaction by notifying the lender of his intent to do so in 
 
language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.”). 
 282  Graham County Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. U.S. ex rel. Wilson, 545 U.S. 
409, 415 (2005) (“Statutory language has meaning only in context.”). 
 283  Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568, 572 (2009) (quoting Bates v. United 
States, 522 U.S. 23, 29 (1997)) (stating that courts should “ordinarily resist reading 
words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its face”). 
 284  Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 583 (2000) (quoting Raleigh & 
Gaston R. Co. v. Reid, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 269, 270 (1872)) (“[W]hen a statute limits a 
thing to be done in a particular mode, it includes a negative of any other mode.”). 
 285  James v. Home Constr. Co., 621 F.2d 727, 729 (5th Cir. 1980) (“§ 1635 is a 
statutorily created right.”); Beach v. Great W. Bank, 670 So. 2d 986, 992 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1996) (“The right of rescission of a security interest for material violations of 
TILA disclosures is not a right existing under the common law.  It is clearly and only 
the creation of statute.”); Jenkins v. Landmark Mortg. Corp., 696 F. Supp. 1089, 1092 
(W.D. Va. 1988) (“The rights which plaintiff seeks to invoke are wholly statutory 
creatures.”). 
 286  See discussion infra Part IV.B.3. 
 287  Great W. Bank, 670 So. 2d at 992 (“While the legislature may be without power 
to abolish common law rights, the legislature may create other rights and impose on 
them such limitations as it deems advisable.  When it does, those limitations form 
part of the assertion of the right itself.”). 
 288  Cf. Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., No. 11-4254, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 
2486 (3d Cir. Feb. 5, 2013). 
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accordance with the regulations.289  Section 1635(f) simply states that 
the right of rescission expires after three years.290  Read together, 
these two provisions state that the right to rescind by notification in 
accordance with the regulations expires after three years of the date of 
the transaction. 
Because § 1635(f) is an extension of the same right provided for 
by the buyer’s remorse provision, there is no reason to suggest that 
the statute contains an additional burden for borrowers asserting the 
right under § 1635(f) as opposed to the buyer’s remorse provision.  
Nothing in the language of the statutes differentiates between 
exercising rescission under the buyer’s remorse provision or under § 
1635(f).291  Indeed, the Supreme Court itself has recognized that § 
1635 says nothing in terms of filing a lawsuit.292  Therefore, it is a 
simple and logical inference that rescission is also exercised via 
notification for the purposes of § 1635(f).  Since notice of rescission 
is clearly sufficient to exercise rescission within three days, it is also 
sufficient to exercise rescission within three years under the terms of 
the statute.293 
i. Sub-Issue: How Long do Borrowers have to Seek Judicial 
Enforcement of Unacknowledged Rescissions? 
TILA’s language is not as clear on the issue of the time 
limitation for borrowers to seek judicial enforcement of rescission when 
rescission is proper, but the lender fails to honor it.  In other words, 
if a borrower properly exercises the right to rescind by notifying the 
creditor, how long does she have under TILA to seek judicial 
enforcement if the lender fails to respond? 
 
 289  15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (2012) (“[T]he obligor shall have the right to rescind the 
transaction until midnight of the third business day following the consummation of 
the transaction or the delivery of the information and rescission forms required 
under this section together with a statement containing the material disclosures 
required under this title, whichever is later, by notifying the creditor, in accordance with 
regulations of the Bureau, of his intention to do so.”) (emphasis added). 
 290  15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) (2012) (“An obligor’s right of rescission shall expire three years 
after the date of consummation of the transaction or upon the sale of the property, 
whichever occurs first, notwithstanding the fact that the information and forms 
required under this section or any other disclosures required under this chapter [15 
USCS §§ 1631 et seq.] have not been delivered to the obligor.”) (emphasis added).  
 291  Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., No. 07-5040, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137315, 
at *32 (E.D. Pa. May 7, 2010) (“[N]either the statute nor the regulation requires the 
filing of suit within the time period, and neither differentiates between the notice 
required to invoke rescission within the three-day or the three-year period.”). 
 292  Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 417 (1998). 
 293  See Sherzer, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137315, at *32. 
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Many courts applying the plain language analysis of § 1635 have 
imposed the one-year statute of limitations under § 1640(e) to this 
type of situation.294  Under this view, borrowers have one year after 
notifying of rescission to seek enforcement and damages from the 
lender’s failure to honor rescission.  While the one-year limit to seek 
a damage award for failure to honor rescission is clearly appropriate 
under the statute, however, it is unclear whether this can or should 
be used as a limit on seeking judicial enforcement of rescission, an 
equitable remedy.295  The courts have essentially read this one-year 
limitation on judicial enforcement of rescission into the statute to put 
a firm time limit on enforcement.296  Perhaps the difficulty of 
resolving this issue is what has inspired some courts to regard 
notification as an insufficient exercise of rescission, in spite of the 
statutory language to the contrary.297 
Nonetheless, it is difficult to imagine a case where the borrower 
exercises rescission but does not seek to enforce it, either by refusing 
to make payments on the loan and forcing foreclosure or 
modification, or by actively seeking judicial enforcement.298  In the 
rare instance where a borrower induces a lender to keep accepting 
 
 294  See Gilbert v. Residential Funding LLC, 678 F.3d 271 (4th Cir. 2012); Santos v. 
Countrywide Home Loans, No. 09-912, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71736, at *4–5  (E.D. 
Cal. Aug. 14, 2009); Toney v. LaSalle Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143164, 
at *27–28 (D.S.C. Aug. 9, 2012); In re Hunter, 400 B.R. 651, 660–61 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 
2009).  Many courts have held that a lender’s failure to honor rescission creates a 
private cause of action for money damages.  Because this action would be for money 
damages, § 1640(e)’s one year limitation would clearly apply and begin to run at the 
date of the lender’s failure to honor. 
 295  The appropriateness of utilizing § 1640(e) to limit rescission actions is 
questionable because that provision is focused on actions seeking money damages 
and clearly does not encompass enforcement of equitable remedies such as 
rescission.  The issue of seeking money damages for failure to honor rescission, on 
the other hand, is clearly contemplated by § 1640(e).  See text accompanying infra 
note 294. 
 296  For authority for the imposition of an analogous statute of limitations onto a 
federal right of action, see Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United 
States ex rel. Wilson, 545 U.S. 409, 414 (2005) (“To determine the applicable statute 
of limitations for a cause of action created by a federal statute, we first ask whether 
the statute expressly supplies a limitations period.  If it does not, we generally 
‘borrow’ the most closely analogous state limitations period.”). 
 297  See discussion supra Part IV.B.1. 
 298  See discussion supra Part IV.A.2. Moreover, no court disputes that exercising 
rescission in the initial three-day buyer’s remorse period is satisfied via notification.  
The issue of the time limit on seeking judicial enforcement is as present in that 
situation as under the three year statute of repose, even if it does not arise nearly as 
often.  Since it is not a problem under § 1635(a), it should not be a problem under § 
1635(f). 
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payments after having purported to rescind the loan, axioms of the 
common law of contracts and the doctrine of equitable estoppel may 
be more appropriate to protect the lender than TILA’s one-year 
damages limitation, as discussed above.299  These doctrines would also 
protect good faith lenders who fail to void the security interest, after 
relying upon a borrower’s actions as opposed to her words.300 
2. The Plain Language Reading is Consistent with Beach 
As detailed above, in Beach, the Supreme Court held that TILA 
“permits no federal right to rescind, defensively or otherwise, after the 
three-year period of § 1635(f) has run.”301  However, the court made 
no effort to explain what actually constitutes an exercise of the right 
to rescind within the three-year period—whether it is accomplished 
by notice or lawsuit.302  The issue of properly exercising rescission 
within the three-year period had already arisen by the time Beach was 
decided,303 and if the Court had intended to address the issue, it likely 
would have done so clearly. 
Even the underlying policy rationale of the Beach decision is 
consistent with borrowers exercising the rescission right for the 
purposes of § 1635(f) via notification.  In Beach, the Court was 
concerned with whether rescission claims could be raised as defenses 
to recoupment actions outside of 1635(f)’s three-year window.304  The 
Court worried that allowing rescission claims to be raised perpetually 
as defenses in recoupment actions pursuant to § 1640(e) would 
“cloud the title” of mortgages during foreclosure.305  This policy 
concern is simply not present, however, in the context of deciding 
whether notice is a sufficient exercise of the rescission right for the 
purposes of § 1635(f).306  Allowing borrowers who properly notify the 
lender of rescission within three years to be entitled to rescission has 
no effect on Beach’s policy of preventing the clouding of mortgages, 
because the question of whether the loan was rescinded will be 
resolved within a reasonable time prior to or during the foreclosure 
 
 299  See discussion supra Part IV.A.2.   
 300  In a foreclosure action, the borrower in this type of case would be estopped 
from asserting the rescission defense.  See authorities quoted supra notes 287, 288. 
 301  Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 419 (1998) (emphasis added); see 
discussion supra Part III.B.  
 302  See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 303  See discussion supra Part III.A.1. 
 304  See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 305  Beach, 523 U.S. at 418. 
 306  See discussion supra Part IV.A.2.  
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proceeding itself.307  Therefore, the view that notice of rescission 
satisfies § 1635(f) is completely consistent with both the holding of 
Beach and its underlying rationale, and any additional, judicially-
constructed requirements are premised upon a misinterpretation of 
Beach’s holdings.308 
3. Principles of Common Law Rescission Also Support the Plain 
Reading of § 1635(f) 
It is a principle of statutory construction that statutes should be 
construed with reference to common law principles, and that statutes 
should not be read to incorporate changes to the common law unless 
clearly prescribed.309  On the other hand, principles of the common 
law cannot be used to override the intentions of Congress.310 
Rescission as a contract remedy has existed at the common law 
for many years.311  At the common law, rescission was exercised when 
the aggrieved party with the right to rescind expresses it.312  Thus, 
courts have held that common law rescission is a “fact” that is 
“complete” when the aggrieved party makes that fact known to the 
other party, either by lawsuit or by unequivocal notice.313  Under the 
 
 307  Id. 
 308  Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399–400, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821) 
(“[G]eneral expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the 
case in which those expressions are used. If they go beyond the case, they may be 
respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit when the very 
point is presented for decision.”). 
 309  82 C.J.S. Statutes § 473 (2013) (“In case of ambiguity, statutes are to be 
construed with reference to the principles of the common law in force at the time of 
their passage, and statutes are not to be interpreted as effecting any change in the 
common law beyond that which is clearly indicated.”); Moragne v. States Marine 
Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 392 (1970) (“It has always been the duty of the common-
law court to perceive the impact of major legislative innovations and to interweave 
the new legislative policies with the inherited body of common-law principles.”); 
Robert C. Herd & Co. v. Krawill Mach. Corp., 359 U.S. 297, 304 (1959) (quoting 
Shaw v. Merchants’ Nat. Bank, 101 U.S. 557, 565 (1879) (“[N]o statute is to be 
construed as altering the common law, farther than its words import.”). 
 310  Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1709 (2012) (“Congress plainly 
can override those [common law] principles.”). 
 311  See, e.g., Grymes v. Sanders, 93 U.S. 55 (1876). 
 312  17B C.J.S. Contracts § 648 (2013) (“A clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal 
notice of rescission from the aggrieved party to the other party to the contract 
generally is necessary to effect a rescission of the contract.”).  
 313  E.g., Griggs v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 385 F.3d 440, 445–56 (4th Cir. 
2004) (“[R]escission itself is effected when the plaintiff gives notice to the defendant 
that the transaction has been avoided and tenders to the defendant the benefits 
received by the plaintiff under the contract.”); Cunningham v. Pettigrew, 169 F. 335, 
341 (8th Cir. 1909) (“Rescission is a fact, the assertion by one party to avoidable 
contract of his right (if such he had) to avoid it, and when the fact is made known to 
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common law, the other party has the opportunity to accept the 
rescission, and the issue is resolved without the involvement of 
courts.314  If the other party rejects rescission, however, the borrower 
may file a lawsuit to enforce the rescission, but cannot seek damages 
under the contract.315  If notice of rescission was given and is 
considered valid, the judicial proceeding is an equitable proceeding 
to determine whether to confirm or deny the rescission—in other 
words, to confirm or deny the earlier exercise of the rescission right, 
to establish whether the aggrieved party had the right in the first 
place, and to restore the parties through restitution.316  Traditionally 
under the common law, tender by the borrower of property received 
was necessary before a court would grant the equitable remedy of 
rescission.317  The purpose of this common law process is to restore 
the parties to the status quo ante, as if the contract was never signed in 
the first place.318 
TILA’s rescission remedy enhances the protections that the 
common law rescission remedy provides to consumers.319  The 
procedures outlined by the statute seem to acknowledge the common 
 
the other party, whether by a suit or in any other unequivocal way, the rescission is 
complete.”). 
 314  C. Brown Trucking Co. Inc. v. Henderson, 305 Ga. App. 873, 874 (2010) 
(“Parties may by mutual consent abandon an existing contract between them so as to 
make it not thereafter binding and the contract may be rescinded by conduct as well 
as by words.”) (citation omitted). 
 315  Hooker v. Norbu, 899 N.E.2d 655, 658 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (“[R]escission of 
such contract terminates it with restitution.”); 17B C.J.S. Contracts § 656 (2013) (“The 
rescission of a contract precludes the recovery of damages for breach of contract, 
since rescission and damages for breach of contract are inconsistent remedies and 
the decision to pursue one remedy bars the other remedy.”). 
 316  See, e.g., Peterson v. Highland Music, Inc., 140 F.3d 1313, 1322 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(“When a party gives notice of rescission, it has effected the rescission, and any 
subsequent judicial proceedings are for the purpose of confirming and enforcing 
that rescission.”). 
 317  Williams v. Homestake Mortg. Co., 968 F.2d 1137, 1140 (11th Cir. 1992) 
(“Under common law rescission, the rescinding party must first tender the property 
that he has received under the agreement before the contract may be considered 
void.”). 
 318  Grymes v. Sanders, 93 U.S. 55, 62 (1876) (“A court of equity is always reluctant 
to rescind, unless the parties can be put back in statu quo.”); Am. Serv. Ins. Co. v. 
United Auto. Ins. Co., 409 Ill. App. 3d 27, 35 (2011) (“Rescission is the cancellation 
of a contract thereby restoring the parties to their initial status.”). 
 319  Shepard, supra note 99, at 188 (2010) (“TILA’s rescission provisions shift 
significant leverage to consumers by enhancing the protections provided to 
consumers under common law causes of action and remedies, the oldest and most 
basic forms of consumer protection.”). 
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law framework for rescission,320 but add a few key differences to 
protect consumers.  For instance, whereas grounds for rescission 
under the common law for fraud must have been pled with 
particularity to be confirmed, TILA liberalizes the requirements by 
establishing disclosure violations as strict liability for the purposes of 
rescission.321  Additionally, TILA provides borrowers three years to 
rescind the contract,322 whereas under the common law rescission 
must be brought within a “reasonable time.”323  And, significantly, 
TILA reverses the tender requirement, requiring the lender to void 
the security interest before the borrower is required to tender 
payment.324  By reversing the tender requirement, TILA provides 
consumers with extra leverage and more time to obtain financing to 
tender.325 
Despite the few changes to the rescission process made by TILA, 
the plain reading interpretation of § 1635(f) is consistent with the 
basic principles of common law rescission.  Under this view, rescission 
may be resolved without involvement of the courts,326 but the court is 
petitioned to either confirm or deny the validity of the rescission and 
to govern the restitution process.327  Similarly, the common law grants 
the right to rescind to certain parties in certain circumstances, and 
the right may be exercised by a unilateral expression of intent to 
rescind.328  The right must be invoked within a reasonable time upon 
 
 320  See discussion supra Part II.B.1. 
 321  Shepard, supra note 99, at 189.  
 322  15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) (2012). 
 323  17B C.J.S. Contracts § 641 (2013) (“The right to rescind a contract must be 
exercised promptly or within a reasonable time on discovery of facts from which the 
right arises, but what constitutes a reasonable time depends on the circumstances of 
the particular case.”). 
 324  15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(d) (2011).  Some courts have 
re-ordered the statutory rescission process by implementing a conditional rescission 
requirement that depends on the borrower’s ability to make a showing of ability to 
tender.  See generally Shepard, supra note 99; 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (“The procedures 
prescribed by this subsection shall apply except when otherwise ordered by a 
court.”).   
 325  Shepard, supra note 99, at 192. 
 326  Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172, 1183 n.8 (10th Cir. 2012) 
(recognizing in dicta that if the lender responds affirmatively to the borrower’s 
notice of intent to rescind under TILA, rescission may be “complete” and 
enforceable by a court in equity). 
 327  Belini v. Wash. Mut. Bank, F.A., 412 F.3d 17, 25 (1st Cir. 2005) (“[S]ection 
1635 is written with the goal of making the rescission process a private one, worked 
out between creditor and debtor without the intervention of the courts.”) (emphasis 
added). 
 328  17B C.J.S. Contracts § 646 (2013) (“As a general rule, to effect a rescission of a 
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discovery of the cause for rescission,329 and a court may later grant an 
equitable remedy of rescission if the party seeking to rescind was 
justified.330  Section 1635(f) changes this common law process by 
mandating the time limit for the rescission right to be invoked: 
instead of being limited by “reasonableness,” the period to exercise 
rescission is expanded to three years.  In most other respects, this 
reading of § 1635(f) is consistent with the underlying process 
involved at common law rescission. 
The Rosenfield court sought to justify on common law grounds its 
restrictive holding that § 1635(f) requires the filing of a lawsuit.331  
While the court accurately described TILA rescission as analogous to 
common law rescission,332 the court nonetheless found that a key 
policy behind common law rescission—”remedial economy”—
justified its restrictive view of § 1635(f).333  The court reasoned that 
the difficulties in enforcing the Fourth Circuit’s view of § 1635(f) 
would jeopardize remedial economy by clouding the title of 
mortgages with the potential for rescission indefinitely.334  The 
Rosenfield court’s argument is based upon the erroneous assumption 
that permitting the exercise of rescission via notification would cloud 
the title of mortgages.  Because invoking rescission via notification 
does not burden mortgage titles,335 the Rosenfield court’s argument is 
undercut.  Instead, the Fourth Circuit’s reading of § 1635(f) is 
 
contract, an affirmative act on the part of the person desiring to rescind is necessary, 
and a contract may be rescinded by the parties by their conduct as well as by 
words.”).  Again, to say that rescission is exercised unilaterally is not the same as 
saying that rescission is effected unilaterally.  See discussion supra Part II.B.2. 
 329  17B C.J.S. Contracts § 641 (2013) (“The right to rescind a contract must be 
exercised promptly or within a reasonable time on discovery of facts from which the 
right arises, but what constitutes a reasonable time depends on the circumstances of 
the particular case.”). 
 330  Peterson v. Highland Music, Inc., 140 F.3d 1313, 1322 (9th Cir. 1998) (“When 
a party gives notice of rescission, it has effected the rescission, and any subsequent 
judicial proceedings are for the purpose of confirming and enforcing that 
rescission.”). 
 331  Rosenfield, 681 F.3d at 1184–85.   
 332  Id. at 1184 (“[W]e ascertain no basis for concluding that the TILA rescission 
remedy differs in any material respect from the general form of rescission available 
[at common law.]”). 
 333  Id. (“The primary justification of rescission, however, is remedial economy . . . 
it is not an appropriate remedy in circumstances where its application would lead to 
prohibitively difficult (or impossible) enforcement.”) (internal quotation omitted). 
 334  Id. at 1185 (“The problem with [the exercise via notification] argument is 
that, in a significant number of instances, the remedial economy of the remedy 
would be jeopardized.”). 
 335  See discussion supra Part IV.A.2. 
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indeed consistent with common law rescission. 
C. To the Extent that § 1635(f) is Silent or Ambiguous, Courts Should 
Defer to the Agency’s Reasonable Interpretation Contained in 
Regulation Z 
None of the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals that addressed 
the proper method of exercising rescission under § 1635(f) deferred 
to the CFPB’s336 interpretation of the statute.337  If any ambiguity is to 
be found in the statute, courts will give deference to the 
accompanying regulation if it is a reasonable interpretation of the 
statute.  Here, such deference is warranted because Regulation Z’s 
provisions regarding rescission are a reasonable interpretation of § 
1635. 
Before considering whether the agency’s interpretation of § 
1635 is entitled to deference, it is helpful to review what the 
regulations relating to rescission actually prescribe.  Regulation Z 
states generally that to exercise the right to rescind, a borrower must 
“notify the creditor of rescission by mail, telegram or other means of 
written communication.”338  Unlike the statute, this regulatory 
provision does not differentiate between buyer’s remorse rescission 
(§ 1635(a)) and exercising the extended rescission right under § 
1635(f).339  The following provision, under the same general heading 
of “Consumer’s Right to Rescind,” describes the applicable time 
periods for a consumer to exercise either buyer’s remorse or § 
1635(f) rescission, but states nothing further regarding the method of 
exercising rescission.340  Thus, the regulations clearly state that 
rescission, regardless of which rescission period applies, is exercised 
only by notification.341  The CFPB’s proposed rescission rule 
 
 336  Though the original regulations were promulgated by the FRB, this Part of the 
Comment refers to the promulgating agency as the CFPB for simplicity’s sake.  See 
discussion supra p. 11.  Since the CFPB currently has the authority to implement 
TILA regulations, its interpretation is the most relevant going forward.   
 337  See discussion supra Part III.C.  The failure of these courts to address 
administrative deference issues is indicative of the wider phenomenon of opinions 
failing to address these issues in cases where they are relevant.  See generally William 
N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment 
of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L. J. 1083 (2008).  
 338  12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(2) (2011) (emphasis added).  
 339  Id. 
 340  12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(3).   
 341  In other words, since the only mention of exercising rescission is contained in 
§ 226.23(a)(2), which explicitly declares notice sufficient and refers generally to the 
rescission right regardless of which period applies, notice is sufficient for either the 
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maintains this organization of the regulation,342 and the CFPB itself 
has taken the position in litigation that § 1635(f) only requires 
rescission via notification.343  This raises the question of whether the 
CFPB’s interpretation is entitled to deference by the courts. 
The hallmark case regarding judicial deference to the 
interpretations of statutes by executive agencies remains Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., wherein the 
Supreme Court established a two-part test to determine whether such 
interpretations are entitled to deference.344  Before applying the two-
part test, however, in what some commentators refer to as “Chevron 
Step Zero,”345 courts determine whether the agency was properly 
delegated the authority to promulgate the regulation in the first 
place.346  Thus, it is essential to the analysis that TILA expressly 
provides the CFPB with broad authority to promulgate regulations 
 
three-day or three-year rescission period.  
 342  2012 Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z) (Interim Final Rule), Docket No. 
CFPB–2011–0031, 76 Fed. Reg. 79768, 79803 (Dec. 22, 2011). 
 343  Brief for Amicus CFPB, Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172 (10th 
Cir. 2010) (No. 10-1442), available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov
/f/201203_cfpb_Rosenfield_vs_HSBC_Amicus.pdf; Brief for Amicus CFPB, 
Sobieniak v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., No. 12-1053 (8th Cir. filed Jan. 9, 
2012), available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201204_CFPB_Sobieniak 
-amicus-brief.pdf.  
 344  467 U.S. 837 (1984); see also City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013) 
(reaffirming Chevron’s importance and applying it to uphold an FCC interpretation 
of its own jurisdictional scope of authority). 
 345  Scott A. Keller, How Courts Can Protect State Autonomy from Federal Administrative 
Encroachment, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 45, 66–69 (2008).  
 346  Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (“It is axiomatic 
that an administrative agency’s power to promulgate legislative regulations is limited 
to the authority delegated by congress.”).  A proper delegation of authority was 
traditionally one that provides the agency with an “intelligible principle.”  See Indus. 
Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. API, 448 U.S. 607, 685–86 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., 
concurring).  After the decision in Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 
(2001), in which the Supreme Court upheld a broad delegation for the 
Environmental Protection Agency to set air quality standards at a level “requisite to 
protect the public health,” courts will find a delegation to be proper as long as 
Congress has not delegated “something approaching blank-check legislative 
rulemaking authority to an agency.” Thomas W. Merril, Rethinking Article 1, Section 1: 
From Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2099 (2004).  
Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated that “administrative implementation of a 
particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that 
Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of 
law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the 
exercise of that authority.”  United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) 
(emphasis added).  
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implementing the statute.347  As a result, the analysis can proceed to 
the two-step analysis under Chevron. 
In the first step of the Chevron test, courts ask whether Congress 
has directly spoken on the precise question at issue.348  If the statutory 
language or Congressional intent is clear, courts—and the regulatory 
agency—must give effect to the intent of Congress and this ends the 
inquiry.349  If the statute is silent or ambiguous, courts apply one of 
two levels of analysis to determine whether an agency interpretation 
within a regulation is entitled to deference.  If Congress has explicitly 
left a gap in the statute for the agency to fill, this is considered an 
“express delegation” to “elucidate a specific provision of the statute 
by regulation.”350  If there is such an explicit gap, courts ask whether 
the regulation is “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the 
statute.”351  If, however, Congress left an implicit gap in the statute, “a 
court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision 
for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an 
agency.”352 
With respect to the first prong of Chevron, § 1635(f) is 
ambiguous: unlike the buyer’s remorse provision, § 1635(f) is silent 
on the proper method of exercising rescission.  Because the buyer’s 
remorse provision specifies exercise of rescission via notification, but 
§ 1635(f) does not specify any particular method of exercising the 
right, this may be considered an implicit gap for the implementing 
agency to fill.353  In addition, Congress has not directly spoken on the 
 
 347  15 U.S.C. § 1604(a) (2012) (“The Bureau shall prescribe regulations to carry 
out the purposes of this title.”).  In 2010, TILA was amended to strengthen the 
CFPB’s authority to promulgate rules.  See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1022(b)(4)(B), 124 Stat. 1376 
(2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1604(h) (2012)) (“[T]he deference that a court 
affords to the Bureau with respect to a determination by the Bureau regarding the 
meaning or interpretation of any provision of a Federal consumer financial law shall 
be applied as if the Bureau were the only agency authorized to apply, enforce, 
interpret, or administer the provisions of such Federal consumer financial law.”). 
 348  Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 
(1984).  
 349  Id. at 842–43.  
 350  Id. at 844; see also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001) 
(“When Congress has ‘explicitly left a gap for an agency to fill, there is an express 
delegation of authority . . .’ and any ensuing regulation is binding in the courts 
unless procedurally defective, arbitrary or capricious in substance, or manifestly 
contrary to the statute.”) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44).  
 351  Id. 
 352  Id. (emphasis added). 
 353  As described above, Regulation Z fills this gap by merging both the buyer’s 
remorse provision and § 1635(f) into the same subheading and indicating that both 
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issue of properly exercising rescission rights.354  Though the 
congressional intent behind TILA, and particularly its recent transfer 
of rulemaking authority to the CFPB, suggests that recently Congress 
has been interested in easing requirements for borrowers,355 this can 
hardly be considered a clear statement on the specific issue by 
Congress.  Nor does anything in the legislative history of TILA or its 
amendments constitute a clear statement on the issue. 
These considerations allow the analysis to proceed to the second 
part of Chevron.  The first issue is whether the relevant regulation 
exists as the result of an express delegation from Congress, or whether 
Congress left an implicit gap for the agency to fill as part of its general 
rule-making authority.356  It is plain from the language of the statute 
that determining the method of preserving the rescission right for 
the purposes of § 1635(f) is not expressly delegated to the CFPB.357  
Thus, the power to resolve the ambiguity must have been implicitly 
delegated to the CFPB as part of the agency’s general authority to 
promulgate rules implementing TILA.358 
Since the relevant portion of Regulation Z was promulgated 
pursuant to an implicit delegation of authority, the “reasonable 
interpretation” standard applies.359  In examining the reasonableness 
of the interpretation, it must be noted that the Supreme Court has 
often favored a deferential approach to regulations contained in 
Regulation Z.360  Moreover, the interpretation’s reasonableness is 
 
rescission procedures are exercised the same way.  In other words, Regulation Z 
interprets the statute the same way that the Fourth Circuit and this Comment do.  See 
discussions supra Parts III.C.1, IV.B.1. 
 354  This is, of course, assuming that the statutory language itself is ambiguous, a 
position this Comment strenuously argues against but assumes for the purposes of 
the Chevron argument. 
 355  See discussion supra Part IV.A.1. 
 356  As noted above, different standards of deference apply depending on whether 
the regulation is an expressly or implicitly delegated exercise of authority.   
 357  TILA expressly delegates the authority to determine what constitutes notice.  15 
U.S.C. § 1602(a) (2012) (“The Bureau shall prescribe regulations to carry out the 
purposes of this title.”).  The statute, however, does not expressly delegate the power 
to determine whether notice is a valid exercise of rescission such that it satisfies the 
time limitation of § 1635(f). 
 358  See § 1604(a).  The reason for assuming an implicit delegation is that Congress 
is silent on the method of exercising rescission under § 1635(f), and only the 
implementing agency, with general authority to promulgated regulations, is situated 
to fill that gap.   
 359  Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 
(1984). 
 360  See, e.g., Household Credit Servs. v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232, 238–39 (2004); 
Anderson Bros. Ford v. Valencia, 452 U.S. 205, 219 (1981) (“[A]bsent some obvious 
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evident from considerations of congressional intent, Supreme Court 
precedent, and principles of common law.  As noted above, a 
borrower-friendly reading of § 1635(f) is consistent both with the 
underlying goals of TILA and the recent actions by Congress seeking 
to expand consumer protection laws.361  The Regulation Z 
interpretation is also consistent with the Supreme Court’s reasoning 
and policy rationale outline in Beach,362 and with the process of 
common law rescission.363  And finally, the interpretation is in 
accordance with the principle that a remedial statute should be 
construed liberally to protect the people it seeks to help.364 
Another testament to Regulation Z’s reasonableness is that the 
regulation’s interpretation of § 1635(f) is consistent with similar 
limitations statutes in other contexts.  For instance, the Uniform 
Commercial Code contains a one-year statute of repose that requires 
bank customers to object within one year of receiving notice of an 
unauthorized wire transfer.365  If objection is not made, the right to be 
reimbursed by the bank extinguishes.366  And in some states, a valid 
claim against a public entity is extinguished unless the potential 
claimant notifies the State of the claim within a specified time 
period.367  Just as Regulation Z allows preservation of the rescission 
right via notification, these limitation statutes are satisfied not by 
 
repugnance to the statute, the . . . regulation implementing [TILA] should be 
accepted by the courts.”); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 565 
(1980) (“[C]aution must temper judicial creativity in the face of legislative or 
regulatory silence . . . deference is especially appropriate in the process of 
interpreting the Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z.”).  These cases typically 
involved the application of Chevron to more technical regulations, such as regulations 
governing specific disclosure requirements.  
 361  See discussion supra Part IV.A.1.  
 362  See discussion supra Part IV.B.2. 
 363  See discussion supra Part IV.B.3. 
 364  See, e.g., King v. California, 784 F.2d 910, 915 (9th Cir. 1986) (“The courts have 
construed TILA as a remedial statute, interpreting it liberally for the consumer.”) 
(citation omitted). 
 365  See, e.g., U.C.C. § 4A-505 (2003); Regatos v. North Fork Bank, 5 N.Y.3d 395, 
403 (N.Y. 2005) (“[A] bank has an obligation to refund the principal regardless of 
notice, provided such notice is given within one year in accordance with UCC4-A-
505 . . . .  The period of repose in section 4-A-505 is essentially a jurisdictional 
attribute of the “rights and obligations” contained in UCC 4-A-204 (1).”) (citations 
omitted). 
 366  U.C.C. § 4A-505 (2003).  
 367  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258 § 4 (2012); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:8-8 (West 
2012), N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-16 (LexisNexis 2013).  Since tort claims against a state 
are only allowed to proceed due to the state’s waiver of sovereign immunity, these 
statutes are examples of notification satisfying a repose period to preserve a right 
granted by the state. 
FERRANTELLI (DO NOT DELETE) 4/9/2014  2:14 PM 
746 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:695 
 
filing a lawsuit, but by engaging in some other sort of action to 
preserve a right granted by statute.  Since these types of statutes exist 
in other contexts, Regulation Z’s interpretation of § 1635(f) to be this 
type of statute is reasonable and is therefore entitled to deference 
from the courts under Chevron. 
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
Though the statutory and regulatory language appear to state 
that exercise of rescission is accomplished via notification to the 
lender, either Congress or the Supreme Court may act to resolve the 
split among the circuits.  A gross misinterpretation of a Supreme 
Court case, as well as an inartfully drawn statute, placed into jeopardy 
the rescission rights of many borrowers.  Either of the following two 
fixes would repair the situation. 
A. The Supreme Court Can Resolve the Split Created by Beach 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Beach and the subsequent 
surge in foreclosure filings that occurred during the financial crisis of 
the 2000s are the causes of the split between the circuits concerning 
the exercise of rescission rights.368  The Third and Fourth Circuits 
have read § 1635(f) to only require notice of rescission, but the Ninth 
and Tenth circuits have reached the opposite conclusion largely by 
relying, albeit erroneously, on the Beach decision.369  Both district and 
bankruptcy courts throughout the country have disagreed on this 
issue. 
As a result of this confusion, the Supreme Court should revisit § 
1635(f).  The Court should clarify that Beach only stood for the 
proposition that § 1635(f) is a strict three-year time limitation on 
rescission claims, and that the Court did not rule in that case on the 
proper method of exercising the right to rescind within the three-
year period.  Instead, the Court should confirm that the plain 
meaning of the statute and accompanying regulations detail the 
exercise of the rescission right.  The Court should clarify that, as 
under buyer’s remorse rescission, a borrower can exercise the right to 
rescind under § 1635(f) by notifying the lender of rescission.  If the 
lender is properly and timely notified, the rescission right has been 
exercised, and a court may confirm or deny the rescission in a 
 
 368  See discussion infra Part 695III.C. 
 369  Id. 
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subsequent proceeding.370 
B. A Legislative Amendment To Clarify § 1635(f) 
As discussed, under the terms of the statute there is little reason 
to conclude that exercising the three-day rescission right is any 
different from exercising the three-year extended rescission right.371  
Regulation Z, by incorporating both modes of exercising rescission 
into the same regulatory heading, supports this interpretation.372  
Nonetheless, a legislative amendment can make the statute even 
more clear.  Such an amendment must clearly indicate that the mode 
of exercising the rescission right is the same under either buyer’s 
remorse rescission or § 1635(f).  A simple amendment to § 1635(f) 
would accomplish this.  An example of proposed legislation is 
provided in Figure 2, with the proposed amended language 
underlined.373 
 
Figure 2—Sample Proposed Legislation to Clarify the Exercise of 
Rescission Rights under § 1635(f) 
 
§ 1635. Right of rescission as to certain transactions 
 . . . 
(f)  Time limit for exercise of right. An obligor’s right of 
rescission shall expire three years after the date of consummation of 
the transaction or upon the sale of the property, whichever occurs 
first, unless the right of rescission is exercised before expiration by 
notifying the creditor, in accordance with regulations of the Bureau, 
of the obligor’s intention to rescind,  . . . 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
TILA’s right of rescission is an important remedy for many 
borrowers, particularly those borrowers who have unwittingly become 
saddled with loans they will not be able to repay.  The rescission right 
is a strict liability right to rescind certain loans, and the right extends 
 
 370  The Court may also seek to answer the growing question of whether 
notification immediately voids the transaction, or whether the transaction is only 
legally voided after confirmation by a court.  See discussion supra Part II.B.2.  This 
Comment does not take a position on that issue. 
 371  See discussion supra Part IV.B.1. 
 372  12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a) (2011).   
 373  Infra Figure 2. 
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to up to three years after the date of the transaction pursuant to § 
1635(f) of TILA.  Since the collapse of the housing industry, and 
subsequent drop in the value of homes, many borrowers are in no 
position to hire a lawyer and initiate costly litigation just to have the 
right of rescission survive the statutorily-prescribed period.  
Moreover, many of these borrowers have made good-faith attempts to 
comply with the law, by relying on indications on the notice of 
rescission form that rescission is accomplished via notification, but 
have had their rescission claims rejected by courts as untimely.  Other 
borrowers, such as Ms. McOmie-Gray, have encountered lenders that, 
after receiving notice of rescission, cynically stonewall with hopeless 
negotiations until the repose period for rescission expires, after 
which point they file a foreclosure complaint. 
The Supreme Court itself noted that neither the statute nor 
regulations discuss any requirement that borrowers must file a lawsuit 
in order for their rescission claims to survive the repose period.  
Indeed, as the Fourth Circuit and many lower courts concluded, the 
plain language of TILA simply requires borrowers to notify the lender 
of intention to rescind within three years.  Other circuits have read 
an additional requirement into the law, requiring borrowers to notify 
lenders of rescission and to file a lawsuit seeking rescission within 
three years.  These courts have largely relied on and misinterpreted 
Supreme Court doctrine.  A correction of these misinterpretations is 
necessary to protect good faith borrowers and prevent lenders from 
escaping liability for TILA violations by stonewalling borrowers. 
TILA must be read to allow rescission claims to survive if notice 
of rescission has been provided to the lender within three years of the 
consummation of the loan.  As noted, the plain language of TILA 
and its regulations support the Third and Fourth Circuits’ view that 
notice is a sufficient exercise of rescission.  This interpretation is 
completely consistent with the holdings of Supreme Court precedent, 
as well as the underlying policy rationales behind that precedent.  
This interpretation is also consistent with the principles of common 
law rescission, and the recent public policies pursued by a Congress 
interested in protecting borrowers from unfair credit practices.  
Finally, given TILA’s nature as a remedial statute, and the courts’ 
admonishment that it must be interpreted it in the light most 
favorable to borrowers, the plain language of the statute should be 
relied upon by courts interpreting § 1635(f), which would allow 
borrowers to satisfy the time limitation through notice alone. 
 
